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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This ASPI report is the first publication from a continuing, open-source study of the coalition campaign against 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The report is an important part of ASPI’s mission to provide policy 
relevant research and analysis to better inform Government decisions and public understanding of strategic and 
defence issues. With Australian blood and treasure committed to the efforts of the coalition, it is important for ASPI 
to provide research and constructive commentary on the campaign efforts and dedicate the time and expertise of 
our analysts to the understanding of events, decisions, costs, risks and potential outcomes.
Australia’s role in the international coalition is currently limited to airstrikes on targets in Iraq and an evolving 
commitment to training elements of the Iraqi security forces. Both roles are indefinitely sustainable, given the ADF’s 
capacity to rotate forces and projections of defence spending. The broader challenge for Canberra will be to explain 
how this fits into a credible international strategy with a realisable political objective.
The campaign to ‘degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism 
strategy’ is essentially a work in progress. ISIL’s rapid advances of mid-2014 have been checked, but the group 
has shown itself to be tough and able to adapt its tactics. In 2015, it will become apparent how much more can be 
done to degrade ISIL via airstrikes. The first half of the year will be decisive for the Iraqi Army in showing whether 
it can retake and then effectively administer territory. Including the Sunni minority, especially in the west and 
north of Iraq, and limiting Iranian influence will both be critical to subsequent phases of the campaign. More 
broadly, a credible political solution in Syria and Iraq remains elusive. The absence of an international interest 
in or commitment to tackling the region’s deep-seated political problems will constrain the effectiveness of the 
campaign against ISIL into the future.
This report is designed to be read in conjunction with ASPI’s interactive map of coalition airstrikes, which details the 
date, location, target and effect of all strikes reported by US Central Command at the time of writing. It also shows 
coalition humanitarian and military airdrops, and the authors thank Rosalyn Turner for her assistance collating 
that information. The map, developed by ASPI’s Luke Wilson, can be viewed at first100days.aspi.org.au. On that 
website, readers will also find this report’s airstrikes database, which collates all the strike information reported by 
US Central Command at the time of writing. So far as we can tell, this database is the most accurate open-source 
collation of information on coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria to date. The maps featured in this report have also 
been specially commissioned from this research effort.
ASPI’s research team will continue to study and assess the campaign against ISIL as long as the campaign affects 
the future of Australian strategic policy. We expect to publish future reports and analysis that will be timely and 
relevant to the strategic discourse in Australia.
ASPI welcomes critical feedback about its work from the Defence community and the general public.
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CHAPTER 2
A holding strategy: the campaign against ISIL
Peter Jennings
Two speeches defined US President Barack Obama’s view of the crisis in Iraq and Syria. In the first, a downcast 
address to graduating West Point cadets on 28 May 2014, Obama set much higher thresholds for America to deploy 
military force overseas:
The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it—when our 
people are threatened, when our livelihoods are at stake, when the security of our allies is in danger … On the 
other hand, when issues of global concern do not pose a direct threat to the United States … then the threshold 
for military action must be higher.1 
By May 2014, ISIL had consolidated its grip on much of Syria and mounted terror attacks and military operations in 
Iraq for over 12 months. It had captured and stubbornly held the city of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi, the capital of 
Anbar Province, in January 2014. On 10 June, ISIL captured Mosul—Iraq’s second largest city, with a population of 
around 700,000. A quarter of the Iraqi Army had collapsed, thrown down their weapons and deserted—some 60 of 
243 combat battalions couldn’t be accounted for. By 17 June, ISIL forces using captured American vehicles and 
military equipment had reached Diyala, 60 kilometres north of Baghdad. In August, they captured the Mosul Dam, 
moved to threaten the Kurdish-speaking Yazidis (40,000 of whom had sought refuge on the Sinjar Mountain) and 
threatened the Kurdish provincial capital of Erbil.2 
In less than 10 weeks and to the apparent surprise of governments and intelligence organisations, substantial parts 
of north, west and central Iraq had fallen to a terror organisation. In September, the CIA estimated that the number 
of ISIL’s fighters had grown from around 10,000 to between 20,000 and 31,000—15,000 of whom were in Syria.3 
Using appalling violence and sophisticated propaganda, a few thousand fighters had panicked the Iraqi Army and 
put millions of Iraqi citizens under ISIL’s control.
On 10 September, President Obama announced a campaign to ‘degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a 
comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy’. By then the US had launched about 150 airstrikes in 
northern Iraq. Obama identified four main aims for the international coalition then being assembled:
First, we will conduct a systematic campaign of airstrikes against these terrorists. Working with the Iraqi 
government, we will expand our efforts beyond protecting our own people and humanitarian missions, so 
that we’re hitting ISIL targets as Iraqi forces go on offense … Second, we will increase our support to forces 
fighting these terrorists on the ground … As I have said before, these American forces will not have a combat 
mission—we will not get dragged into another ground war in Iraq. But they are needed to support Iraqi and 
Kurdish forces with training, intelligence and equipment … Across the border, in Syria, we have ramped up our 
military assistance to the Syrian opposition … we must strengthen the opposition as the best counterweight 
to extremists like ISIL … Third, we will continue to draw on our substantial counterterrorism capabilities to 
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prevent ISIL attacks. Working with our partners, we will redouble our efforts to cut off its funding; improve our 
intelligence; strengthen our defenses; counter its warped ideology; and stem the flow of foreign fighters into and 
out of the Middle East … Fourth, we will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians who 
have been displaced by this terrorist organization. …4 
Australia was among the first countries to commit to the international coalition of forces. On 3 October 2014, Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott announced:
The Government will commit up to eight Australian F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft to participate in airstrikes 
in Iraq as part of the international coalition formed to disrupt and degrade ISIL. Once the appropriate legal 
arrangements are in place with the Iraqi government, Australian Special Forces will also deploy to Iraq to advise 
and assist Iraqi security forces. These forces will join the RAAF E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control 
aircraft and KC-30A multi-role tanker transport already supporting coalition air operations over Iraq.5 
The Australian strike package commenced operations on 5–6 October. After an inexplicably long delay, Australian 
special forces deployed from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) into Iraq in November to take up a training role with 
Iraqi special forces.
Difficult questions abounded at the start of the coalition campaign. It wasn’t clear how such a limited campaign of 
airstrikes, coupled with a very small contingent of trainers, could have a decisive impact. On paper, the Iraqi military 
comprises around 280,000 regular troops, and there are close to half a million police. In Iraq, a dysfunctional 
government and collapsed military faced an opponent that was psychologically ascendant. Syria presented an 
even bigger challenge, its civil war having effectively been ignored by the US for the previous two years. Who 
should the allies assist when faced with, as Tony Abbott called it, a war of baddies versus baddies?6 Although 
the US was able to quickly assemble a large group of countries willing to be involved in the fight against ISIL, the 
‘coalition’ was a diverse group: a number of Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey and the UAE, all had 
different underlying strategic motivations for their participation. Many others showed variable willingness to use 
armed force.
However, airstrikes against ISIL took place in the days following Obama’s 10 September statement. From the outset, 
the air campaign seemed to owe more to sloth and pause than to shock and awe. It was soon clear that airstrikes 
were going to be limited and highly selective. This was to be a campaign of slow strangulation. The Pentagon’s 
spokesman, Rear Admiral John Kirby, said that degrading and destroying ISIL could not be done militarily. ISIL’s 
ideology is the thing that needs to be destroyed, he said: ‘that’s not going to be defeated through military means 
alone. It’s going to take time and it’s going to take good governance, responsive politics, both in Iraq and in Syria.’7 
Based on Obama’s September speech, the international coalition has managed to degrade but not destroy ISIL 
through an air campaign in Syria and Iraq that’s involved around 1,000 strikes in the first 100 days of the operation. 
Actions to degrade ISIL capability have included:
• destroying a significant number of vehicles, ranging from commercial cars and trucks to captured US Humvees, 
tanks, artillery pieces, rocket launchers and earthmoving equipment
• killing an unspecified number of ISIL fighters, particularly in and around the town of Kobane
• destroying elements of ISIL infrastructure, such as guard posts, some headquarters buildings in Syria and 
infrastructure designed to generate ISIL finances, including in the black market oil trade.
Iraq: assessment after 100 days
In Iraq, the strikes have partially but by no means completely contained ISIL. Much of the forward momentum of ISIL 
operations against the Kurds in the north, around Baghdad and in Anbar Province seemed to slow towards the end 
of September. ISIL has no longer been able to move in formations of military vehicles because they can be identified 
and hit from the air. This has limited its capacity for conventional military manoeuvres.
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ISIL responded to the air campaign by changing tactics. Large convoys flying ISIL flags, which were seen in 
June and July, have ceased. ISIL has clearly worked hard to disguise leadership movements. A rare break in its 
operational security allowed coalition forces to attack a house in the western Iraqi border town of al-Qaim, where 
it was understood that a leadership meeting was taking place, on 7 November. Reports that ISIL leader Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi was wounded in the strike appear to have been disproved by the subsequent release of an audio 
recording of the leader.8 
It’s clear that US rules of engagement place considerably more restrictions on the use of airstrikes than was the 
case during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Over the first 100 days, the vast majority of strikes in Iraq were against clearly 
identified military targets, often single vehicles or guard posts. Mosul, where significant numbers of ISIL fighters 
are located, has been off limits. For the coalition, this has had the benefit of significantly reducing claims that it’s 
been killing civilians. Narrow rules of engagement have also constrained the coalition in targeting ISIL leaders. Many 
strikes have had only very limited tactical effect.
With its options for quasi-conventional military tactics constrained, ISIL returned to more traditional insurgency 
tactics. A number of towns and villages in Anbar Province have been infiltrated by ISIL fighters undetected by 
coalition aircraft. ISIL is reported to have built up strength at Abu Ghraib, 40 kilometres west of Baghdad and  
within shelling distance of the city’s international airport. ISIL has previous history in the area: it staged an attack on 
the Abu Ghraib prison in July 2013, freeing more than 500 people.9 There’s considerable local Sunni sympathy  
for the group at Abu Ghraib and throughout Anbar Province. ISIL has also been able to stage regular bomb  
attacks in Baghdad over the past few months. On 16 October, for example, two car bombs, a suicide bomber and 
several attacks with mortar rounds were reported to have killed at least 50 in different Baghdad suburbs.10 On 
17 November, ISIL claimed responsibility for a suicide car bomb attack on a UN convoy near Baghdad airport.11 
Twenty-four hours earlier, a bomb attack in a car park at the airport wounded a number of people. On the same day, 
a bomb in a Baghdad commercial area killed three.12 Similar incidents have been occurring daily in Baghdad for 
months. The continuation of this violence shows that ISIL and its supporters have comparatively easy freedom of 
movement around central Iraq.
On 19 August, following some days of US airstrikes, Iraqi military and Kurdish Peshmerga fighters retook the 
strategically important Mosul Dam, which had been captured by ISIL several weeks earlier.13 Reinforced with US 
advisers and coalition airdrops of weapons, the Peshmerga seemed able to hold ISIL at bay in the north of Iraq. In 
the centre of the country, fighting between Iraqi forces, Sunni militias of unclear pedigree and ISIL produced more 
mixed results, but the coalition’s sustained pressure on ISIL seemed to be turning a corner from late October. In 
mid-November, it looked as though Iraqi forces were gaining control of critical assets in the town of Bayji, close to 
Iraq’s biggest oil refinery, where a hard-pressed Iraqi military unit had been under siege by ISIL for five months. In 
October, ISIL brought down an Iraqi Mi-17 helicopter and a Bell 407 helicopter using shoulder-fired, man-portable air 
defence systems apparently sourced from Syria.14 The refinery was nearly overrun by ISIL on 11 October, prompting 
airdrops of supplies to the besieged forces.
However, ISIL fighters were said to be retreating from Bayji on 18 November. On a visit to Baghdad, the Chairman 
of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, said ‘And now, I think it’s starting to turn. So well done.’15 
November reports also indicated significant fighting around Abu Ghraib: an Iraqi Interior Ministry statement of 
13 November claimed that ‘A joint force managed to destroy four strongholds used as ISIL headquarters in the 
Awda Bridge area, west of Abu Ghraib, killing ISIL elements there.’16
It isn’t clear how decisive the US ground force ‘advise and assist’ role has been in shaping these tentative Iraqi 
gains. In mid-October, for example, it was reported that 12 US special forces teams, each comprising 12 trainers, 
had been attached to 12 Iraqi Army headquarters units at brigade level and higher. Seven of the teams were in the 
Baghdad area, and five were around Erbil. No US advisers were with Iraqi units in Anbar, apparently because of 
force protection concerns. US assistance was limited and far removed from any combat on the basis that this was a 
mission that the Iraqis needed to ‘own’.17
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On 7 November, President Obama authorised the deployment of an additional 1,500 US troops:
… in a non-combat role to train, advise, and assist Iraqi Security Forces, including Kurdish forces. The President 
also authorized U.S. personnel to conduct these integral missions at Iraqi military facilities located outside 
Baghdad and Erbil. U.S. troops will not be in combat, but they will be better positioned to support Iraqi Security 
Forces as they take the fight to ISIL.18 
Obama claimed that a new phase in the campaign had been reached, but it was difficult to escape the thought that 
the President’s most critical turning point had been the conclusion of the mid-term US congressional elections. 
American military planners aimed to speed up the deployment of the additional forces, with a view to having them 
train 12 Iraqi brigades.
As was the case with the campaign in Iraq in 2007—the time of the Petraeus ‘surge’—a critical factor for success in 
Iraq remains the willingness of Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar Province to work with the Iraqi Government against 
terrorist forces. There’s little sign at this stage of an ‘Anbar awakening’ like the one in 2007, when the Sunni tribes 
decided that they’d had enough of the brutal behaviour of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. ISIL is a significantly more capable force 
and even more intimidating than its al-Qaeda predecessors. The Iraqi military’s progress (or lack of it) in Anbar will 
be a defining factor in the progress of the war in 2015.
Syria: assessment after 100 days
Over the past three years, around 200,000 Syrians have been killed in the country’s civil war. More than 3 million 
refugees have fled to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, and millions more have been displaced within Syria. Vicious 
fighting between forces loyal to President Assad and a variety of dissident groups (ranging from the allegedly 
‘moderate’ elements of the Free Syrian Army to ISIL and the al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra Front) have decimated 
large parts of the country. ISIL has secured control of the city of Raqqah and much of the northern third of the 
country. Its control of oilfields at Deir ez-Zor has helped it to fund its operations through the sale of oil on the black 
market.19 It appears that the group moved much of the US-sourced military equipment abandoned by the Iraqis 
into  ts Syrian strongholds and used it in a sustained, largely conventional force, attack on the town of Kobane on 
the Syrian–Turkish border.
Syria is reportedly the home of around half of ISIL’s fighters.20 The absence of Western intervention has made the 
northern part of the country an effective safe haven. It was the staging ground for the January and June attacks into 
Iraq and remains the key to ISIL’s aspirations for long-term success.
The challenge for the US and coalition countries has been to design a strategy that weakens ISIL but doesn’t lend 
comfort or direct assistance to Syrian President Assad. The US remains wedded to the policy that it won’t put 
boots on the ground in Syria. The combination of these constraints makes developing coherent strategy almost 
impossible. President Obama described his goals on 10 September:
… in Syria, we have ramped up our military assistance to the Syrian opposition … I call on Congress again to 
give us additional authorities and resources to train and equip these fighters. In the fight against ISIL, we cannot 
rely on an Assad regime that terrorizes its own people—a regime that will never regain the legitimacy it has lost. 
Instead, we must strengthen the opposition as the best counterweight to extremists like ISIL, while pursuing the 
political solution necessary to solve Syria’s crisis once and for all.
As of late November, there’s no greater clarity about the plan to train a force of around 5,000 ‘vetted’ Syrian fighters. 
Saudi Arabia may be the training ground, but we don’t know who’ll be trained, what they’ll be trained to do, what 
military capabilities the force will have, and what difference such a force might make against much larger Assad 
loyalist forces (numbered at around 100,000 fighters)21 or ISIL. The US has indicated that vetting Syrians to find 
acceptable fighters and training them will take months. Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral Kirby referred to this 
process as ‘a year-long pipeline of training opportunities’.22 At the earliest, US-backed ground operations involving 
the 5,000 ‘moderate’ fighters might be able to start around the beginning of 2016. A US presidential election 
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year is an unpropitious time to start a major new military campaign. The recent defeat of the US-backed Syrian 
Revolutionary Front and Harakat Hazm in Idlib Province indicates that US support appears to be too little, too late.23 
Coalition airstrikes began in Syria on 22 September. Late that month, the US used the F-22 Raptor on its first 
combat operation since it entered service, possibly in anticipation of the need to attack remnant Syrian air defence 
capabilities but equally possibly, as one analyst speculated, to ‘take the bubble wrap off’ the aircraft.24 A remarkable 
array of aircraft and precision weapons were used in the strikes, which were notable for the involvement of Bahrain, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE (Australia has limited its airstrikes to Iraq). Initial strikes, including with 
cruise missiles, were directed at Raqqah. Over October, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said 
that 521 Islamist fighters, including 464 from ISIL, were killed in Syria as a result of coalition airstrikes, most of them 
in Raqqah.25 The US indicated that a particular object of the targeting had been to disrupt ISIL oil production and 
financial activities. ISIL forces at the Deir ez-Zor oil refinery were struck regularly during September and October.
By far the greatest concentration of airstrikes in the first 100 days of the campaign was directed at ISIL forces 
‘besieging’ the Syrian town of Kobane, on the border with Turkey. Major strikes took place almost every day of 
October and into November as ISIL continued to throw a major portion of its fighters into its attempt to take the 
town. The US CENTCOM Commander, General Lloyd Austin, said on 17 October that ‘If he [ISIL] continues to present 
us with major targets, as he has done in the Kobane area, then clearly, we’ll service those targets, and we have done 
so very, very, effectively of late.’26 
The concentration of ISIL’s effort on Kobane is puzzling. Some have speculated that it wanted to control a border 
crossing into Turkey, but the Turks quickly closed the border, stationing armoured units in what’s an ethnically 
Kurdish area. ISIL’s massing of forces in a way that made them easier targets appeared to be a tactical error, but it’s 
clear that even under multiple daily airstrikes ISIL fighters were pressing the town’s Kurdish defenders hard. At best, 
the campaign to late November could be declared a stalemate. As with most of its activities, ISIL appeared to be 
most interested in the propaganda effect of the Kobane campaign. Aside from Western film crews reporting on the 
battle from the Turkish side of the border, by the end of October ISIL was making its own well-produced propaganda 
from Kobane using a captured British journalist as its ‘reporter’.27 It wouldn’t have escaped ISIL planners that 
attacking a Kurdish town put the Turkish Government under sustained pressure from its own Kurdish population. 
The wider effect of Kobane was to promote a common Kurdish cause across Iraq, Syria and Turkey, which suits ISIL’s 
agenda of fragmenting existing national structures and thereby strengthening its ‘caliphate’ in Sunni territory.
The campaign in 2015 and beyond
It’s apparent that the campaign to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL is going to last for years. A White House ‘fact 
sheet’ released on 7 November described the broader strategic outlook:
ISIL poses an immediate threat to Iraq, Syria, and American allies and partners throughout the region as it seeks 
to overthrow governments, control territory, terrorize local populations, and implement an oppressive and 
intolerant interpretation of sharia law. If left unchecked, ISIL could pose a growing threat to the United States 
and others beyond the region. Thousands of foreign fighters—including Europeans and some Americans—have 
joined ISIL in Syria and Iraq. We are concerned that these trained and battle-hardened fighters will try to return 
to their home countries and carry out deadly attacks.28 
Apart from a steady squeezing of ISIL, which has slowed its advance and destroyed quantities of American military 
equipment, the coalition’s strategy has achieved very little. ISIL’s position at the end of 2014 remains strong. Among 
its strengths is its continuing capacity to develop effective propaganda that helps to recruit foreign fighters. ISIL 
continues to have a substantial funding base and is well armed. Core areas of territory remain solidly under its 
control in Syria and Iraq. ISIL’s broader weaknesses include the unattractiveness of its ideology to any but a small 
minority of potential recruits. The organisation’s shift to more conventional military capability has overextended it 
and caused it to suffer significant casualties, which might not be sustainable for long.
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The US’s position is strengthened by its unparalleled capacity to use air power, which will degrade ISIL over time 
and prevent it from making easy gains of territory. However, that strength has to be offset against a set of broader 
problems and challenges for the US. First, it’s clear that President Obama will keep the US military role very limited. 
Washington won’t deploy large-scale ground forces. Second, there’s no credible longer term strategy to address the 
Syrian crisis. In effect, Obama has created a holding strategy that contains ISIL in Iraq and hits obvious targets in 
Syria, and is waiting for a new US President in 2016 to develop a more definitive strategy.
In Iraq, some early signs in October and November suggest that some units in the Iraqi military are regaining 
confidence and the capacity to take the fight to ISIL. On paper, the Iraqi military is large enough to make short 
work of ISIL, but that ‘strength’ must be offset by the reality that ISIL remains firmly in control of much of the Sunni 
areas in Iraq. There’s yet to be a turning point in the campaign. Baghdad remains under regular terrorist attack and 
vulnerable to the same psychological pressure that caused much of the Iraqi military to throw down its weapons in 
mid-2014. It’s not yet clear that the Iraqi Government has turned a corner in maintaining a firm grip on power or in 
persuading Sunnis that their interests are fundamentally helped by Iraqi unity.
Syria is a humanitarian disaster, in the midst of which ISIL remains the most effective anti-Assad force (with Jabhat 
al-Nusra and its Islamic Alliance a close second). The US strategy for ‘expanding ongoing assistance to the moderate 
Syrian opposition to develop their capacity to provide local security for communities’29 is the least developed and 
least credible part of the anti-ISIL campaign. In the absence of a more thoroughgoing and credible international 
response to the Syrian disaster, there’s no supportable case that victory against ISIL is assured.
The international coalition against ISIL is holding together in the sense that a number of countries are prepared, at 
least for now, to support a constrained campaign of airstrikes in Syria and Iraq (see the ‘Developing the international 
coalition’ section of this report). Support for training the Iraqi military is very much more limited, and so far the 
plan to train a Syrian ‘moderate’ force could best be described as an idea looking for friends. There’s no obvious 
international mechanism allowing the coalition to plan a longer term strategy to counter ISIL. The coalition was 
flung together in great haste in September, and the challenge will be for it to survive into 2015.
Australia’s role in the international coalition is limited to airstrikes on targets in Iraq and an evolving commitment 
to training elements of the Iraqi Army. On 25 November, the ADF Chief of Joint Operations, Vice Admiral David 
Johnston, briefed the media about a series of RAAF strikes against ‘a large, well-established and hidden network of 
caves and bunkers that were concealed in a hill side’ near Kirkuk.30 Around a hundred ISIL militants were reportedly 
killed in this operation, which involved a ground attack by Kurdish fighters. Admiral Johnston said that Defence was 
‘scoping options’ to increase ADF training numbers, should the government want to make a further commitment 
to the operation. Overall, his realistic assessment was that progress against ISIL had been ‘modest’ and that the 
situation in Baghdad was ‘fairly fragile’. Both Australian roles—airstrikes and training—are indefinitely sustainable, 
given the ADF’s capacity to rotate forces. The broader challenge for Canberra will be to explain how this fits into a 
credible international strategy with a realisable political objective.
The campaign to ‘degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism 
strategy’ is essentially a work in progress. ISIL’s rapid advances of mid-2014 have been checked, but the group has 
shown itself to be tough and able to adapt its tactics even while under heavy air attack. In 2015, it will become 
apparent how much more can be done to degrade ISIL via airstrikes. The first half of the year will be decisive for the 
Iraqi Army in showing whether it can retake territory. The Iraqi Government must also begin to include elements of 
the Sunni minority while containing the influence of Iranian-backed Shia militia. More broadly, a credible political 
solution to Syria and Iraq remains elusive. The absence of an international interest in or commitment to tackling the 
region’s deep-seated political problems will constrain the effectiveness of the campaign against ISIL into the future.
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CHAPTER 3
ISIL’s evolution and its military actions in 2014
Simone Roworth
The evolution of ISIL
The roots of ISIL can be traced to the al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) group established by salafi–
jihadi Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.1 Zarqawi led a ruthless campaign 
of attacks across Iraq, directing suicide bombers to blow up mosques, schools, cafes and bustling markets, usually 
in predominantly Shia areas. Among its more high-profile attacks, al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad was responsible for attacks 
against the Jordanian Embassy and UN headquarters in Baghdad, as well as the bombing of the holiest place of Shia 
worship in Iraq, the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf.2 
In 2004, Zarqawi joined forces with al-Qaeda, renaming his group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). He continued his bloody 
campaign, but his ambitions were cut short when he was killed in a US airstrike in 2006. Zarqawi was replaced by 
Egyptian Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. Under Muhajir, AQI joined forces with other Sunni radicals and changed names 
again to become the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), led by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.
By 2010 ISI’s prominence in Iraq had been degraded, thanks to a forceful US counterterrorism campaign, Sunni 
tribal disaffection with AQI’s extremist ideology, and the deaths of both Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar 
al-Baghdadi in US airstrikes in 2010. It was at this point that US troops began withdrawing from Iraq and Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi took over leadership of ISI.
Capitalising on the instability in Iraq following the US withdrawal and extreme dissatisfaction among Iraq’s Sunni 
population with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia-dominated governing coalition, Baghdadi revived Zarqawi’s 
brutal tactics and led a relentless campaign of suicide and car bombings. Baghdadi differed from his predecessor, 
however, in his targeting of not just Shia targets but also Iraqi police and military offices, checkpoints and 
recruiting stations.3 
ISI’s campaign proved attractive to many Iraqis who rushed to join its ranks. Many had either served as commanders 
and soldiers in Saddam Hussein’s military or, more unusually, been members of the secularist Baathist Party. ISI’s 
ranks swelled once again as a result of the group’s ‘Breaking the Walls’ campaign, in which it attacked several Iraqi 
prisons. This included the notorious Abu Ghraib prison where between 500 and 1,000 prisoners, many of whom 
were extremists previously captured by the US, escaped in 2013. One of the escapees would later become one of 
ISIL’s top military commanders.4 
In 2011, ISI also commenced operations in Syria, where the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad had 
descended into civil war. ISI initially joined forces with local Islamist militants, most notably the al-Qaeda-affiliated 
Jabhat al-Nusra, but established itself as a force to be reckoned with in Syria in its own right after a split between 
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the groups, in which ISI commandeered much of Jabhat al-Nusra’s capabilities and many of its fighters.5 ISI 
made significant territorial gains in Syria between 2011 and 2013, fighting both government and rebel forces and 
establishing a stronghold in the northeast of the country.
It was at this point, in April 2013, that Baghdadi renamed his group ‘the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL). In 
January 2014, ISIL took control of Raqqah City in Raqqah Province. Its control of the city gave the group the ability to 
operate freely across the border into Iraq.
ISIL’s military campaign in 2014
Analysts suggest that ISIL is no simple terrorist organisation. Instead, it is a functioning government with a hybrid 
terrorist-army, as convincing in insurgent techniques as it is in conventional warfare designed to conquer and 
govern large swathes of territory.6 
In early 2014, ISIL launched operations into Iraq, quickly taking control of the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. However, 
it was in June, when ISIL seized control of Iraq’s second-largest city of Mosul—near the strategically important Mosul 
Dam—that the seriousness and scale of ISIL’s military operations became clear.
Since June, ISIL has taken over large swathes of land, controlling or contesting territory from Aleppo in Syria’s north 
to cities and towns close to Baghdad in central Iraq—territory roughly the size of the UK. The area is home to more 
than 6 million people—the population of Finland. By mid-October, ISIL had advanced to within 25 kilometres of 
Baghdad airport. At the time of writing, it’s reported that about a third of Iraq is dotted by active ISIL battle fronts.7 
The scale and speed of ISIL’s military campaign in Syria and Iraq since January 2014 have been impressive. Key ISIL 
military and propaganda actions in 2014 include those shown in Table 1. Figure 1 shows the contest for territory in 
Iraq and Syria at the time of writing.
Table 1: ISIL military and propaganda actions, 2014
Date
January 2014
4 January ISIL takes control of Fallujah in the first reported instance of extremists taking over a major Iraqi city 
since the height of the sectarian insurgency after the 2003 US-led invasion. ISIL also seizes control of 
the nearby city of Ramadi.
June 2014
10 June ISIL takes control of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, seizing government offices, the airport and 
police stations. In the process, ISIL acquires over $400 million in cash from the Mosul bank, uniforms, 
small arms, tanks, armoured trucks, Humvees, helicopters and a handful of anti-aircraft batteries. It 
also releases upwards of 2,000 prisoners from Mosul’s prisons.
11 June ISIL takes control of Tikrit, the former home of Saddam Hussein and 150 kilometres from Baghdad.
19 June ISIL captures the Al-Muthanna Chemical Weapons Facility near Lake Tharthar, roughly 72 
kilometres northwest of Baghdad. This was once Saddam Hussein’s premier chemical-weapons 
production facility.
21 June ISIL takes control of al-Qaim, a strategic town on the border with Syria in northwest Iraq.
21 June ISIL takes control of the city of Bayji, north of Tikrit and near Iraq’s largest oil refinery, following the 
desertion of 400 Iraqi soldiers.
22 June In Iraq’s northwest, ISIL forces advance on Haditha and the Haditha Dam, the second-largest dam in 
Iraq after the Mosul Dam.
23 June ISIL captures the al-Waleed border crossing between Syria and Iraq in the west of Iraq. This is the 
second border crossing now controlled by ISIL.
29 June ISIL’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declares the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate, overlapping 
state borders between Iraq and Syria.
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Date
July 2014
3 July ISIL takes control of Syria’s largest oilfield, al-Omar in Deir ez-Zor Province. It’s capable of producing 
75,000 barrels of oil a day. ISIL now controls all of Syria’s main oil- and gasfields.
August 2014
3 August ISIL captures the Yazidi city of Sinjar in Iraq’s north, prompting between 35,000–50,000 Yazidi civilians 
to flee to nearby mountains, without food, water or supplies. ISIL is reported to have massacred scores 
of Yazidis.
7 August ISIL takes control of the strategic Mosul Dam, the largest hydroelectric plant in Iraq.
19 August ISIL releases a video showing the execution of American journalist James Foley.
24 August ISIL captures the Tabqa airbase in eastern Syria, the last remaining stronghold of the Syrian 
Government in Raqqah Province.
September 2014
2 September ISIL releases a video showing the execution of American journalist Steven Sotloff.
13 September ISIL releases a video showing the execution of British aid worker David Haines.
18 September ISIL begins advancing on Kobane, the Kurdish city in Syria’s north on the border with Turkey.
October 2014
3 October ISIL releases a video showing the execution of British aid worker Alan Henning.
4 October ISIL takes control of the city of Hit, 186 kilometres west of Baghdad.
6 October ISIL begins to capture parts of Kobane.
November 2014
16 November ISIL releases a video showing the execution of American aid worker Peter Kassig.
Sources: Sam Koebrich, Mohsin Ali, ‘Map: rebels’ path through Iraq’, Al Jazeera, 12 August 2014, online; CNN Library, ‘ISIS fast facts’, 
CNN, 17 November 2014, online; Stratfor Media Centre, ‘Islamic State Timeline’, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 1 August 2014, online.
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Figure 1: The contest for territory—November 2014
Based on data sourced from Institute for the Study of War, online.
Notes
1 Richard Barrett, The Islamic State, The Soufan Group, November 2014, online.
2 Bobby Ghosh, ‘Roots of evil: a short political history of the terrorists who call themselves the “Islamic State”’, 
Quartz, 13 August 2014, online.
3 Bobby Ghosh, ‘Roots of evil’.
4 Aki Peritz, ‘The great Iraqi jail break’, Foreign Policy, 26 June 2014, online.
5 United Nations, ‘Rule of terror: living under ISIS in Syria’, Report of the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 14 November 2014, online.
6 Ben Hubbard, Eric Schmitt, ‘Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS’, The New York Times, 
27 August 2014, online.
7 Ben Hubbard, ‘ISIS wave of might is turning into a ripple,’ The New York Times, 5 November 2014, online.
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Developing the international coalition
Patricia Dias
The campaign against ISIL is one of the broadest international coalitions the US has ever led. Washington has 
enlisted a diverse range of coalition partners and mobilised the international community around the campaign to 
degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL in Syria and Iraq. By engaging NATO partners and regional allies, appointing 
a Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL,1 and using its role as the chair of a UN Security Council 
meeting to call on ‘the world to join in its effort’,2 the US has built up a sizeable coalition base of more than 
60 partners committed to eliminating ISIL.
While not all coalition partners have contributed to the airstrike campaign directly, noting Secretary of State John 
Kerry’s statement that ‘there is a role for almost every country to play’,3 other partner nations have supported the 
campaign through humanitarian, military and financial aid and assistance. For example, Germany isn’t taking part 
in the campaign militarily but has supplied aid and training to Kurdish and Iraqi security forces.4 
At 3 November 2014, the US Department of State listed the coalition partners as those shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Coalition partners at 3 November 2014
Albania France Luxembourg Serbia
Arab League Georgia Macedonia Singapore
Australia Germany Moldova Slovakia
Austria Greece Montenegro Slovenia
Bahrain Hungary Morocco Somalia
Belgium Iceland NATO Spain
Bulgaria Iraq The Netherlands Sweden
Canada Ireland New Zealand Taiwan
Croatia Italy Norway Turkey
Cyprus Japan Oman Ukraine
Czech Republic Jordan Poland United Arab Emirates
Denmark Kosovo Portugal United Kingdom
Egypt Kuwait Qatar United States
Estonia Latvia Republic of Korea
European Union Lebanon Romania
Finland Lithuania Saudi Arabia
Source: US Department of State, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, online.
CHAPTER 4
Embargoed until 11.59 PM AEDT 15 December. Media may report 16 December 2014.
19DEVELOPING THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION
ASPI STRATEGY
Iran and Syria have also been active in the fight against ISIL, but aren’t acknowledged as coalition partners and 
have been restricted from coalition planning, operations and intelligence sharing. Nevertheless, Iran has resupplied 
Kurdish and Iraqi forces fighting against ISIL, and Tehran continues to play an influential role on the ground (see 
‘The advise and assist mission: land forces on the ground’ section of this report).5 
On 5 September, key allies and partners met in Newport, Wales, on the sidelines of a NATO summit to discuss the 
coalition campaign against ISIL and to develop common goals and the means to achieve them. Partner nations 
agreed to ‘Five Lines of Effort’6 to ensure effective coordination against ISIL:
• military support to Iraqi partners
• stopping the flow of foreign fighters
• countering ISIL’s financing and funding
• addressing humanitarian crises
• delegitimising ISIL’s ideology.
The five lines also describe how coalition partner nations can contribute by helping the Iraqi Government equip its 
security forces at the federal, regional and provincial levels to disrupt ISIL’s activity. Other lines of effort call for all 
member nations to follow UN Security Council Resolution 2170, enacted on 15 August 2014,7 which condemns ISIL 
in the strongest terms and calls on all member states to take significant actions to stop the flow of foreign fighters 
into Iraq and Syria.
While the coalition has drawn attention for its size and breadth, it includes some differences in approach. Calls 
for troops on the ground continue to raise debate, and further tensions between Turkey and Kurdish fighters and 
between Turkey and Saudi Arabia have posed challenges. Qatar’s open support for Syrian Islamist groups and 
equivocation on Jabhat al-Nusra have also caused tension within the coalition.8 Issues have also arisen over 
Turkey’s refusal to allow access to its airfields for fellow NATO members’ aircraft conducting military operations 
against ISIL.9 In addition, the US is the only actor carrying out airstrikes in both Syria and Iraq, as partner nations 
operating in Iraq have declined to attack ISIL in Syria.
It’s also worth noting that some partner nations, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, entered into the airstrike 
campaign for predetermined periods, while others such as the UK and Australia have kept open the option of a 
longer term commitment.
Airstrike coalition nations
Despite these differences, the US has been joined by an impressive number of partner nations in coalition airstrikes. 
According to the most recent US Central Command reports, coalition partners conducting airstrikes in Iraq 
include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the UK and the US, while coalition nations 
conducting airstrikes in Syria include the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Bahrain. The contributions of these 
nations are detailed below (see also Appendix 3 to this report).
Australia
Australia was one of the first countries to join coalition airstrikes against ISIL. On 3 October, Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott announced Australia’s intention to participate. Australia commenced combat operations—Operation Okra—
in Iraq on 5–6 October and conducted its first strike on 8 October.10 
As of 5 November, Australia had planned and led attacks against ISIL targets in Iraq, flying 144 sorties and dropping 
twenty-five 500-pound laser- and GPS-guided bombs on ISIL targets, including logistics bases and storage facilities. 
Australia has contributed six F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter aircraft, one E-7A Wedgetail command and control aircraft 
and one KC-30A multi-role tanker transport refuelling aircraft.
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Australia has also deployed around 600 ADF personnel: 400 assigned to the Air Task Group and 200 special forces 
members assigned to the Special Operations Task Group to advise and assist Iraqi security forces.11 
Bahrain
On the night of 22 September, Bahrain conducted coalition airstrikes with the US and other Arab partners in Tabqah, 
Tall al-Qitar, Deir ez-Zor, al-Hasakah and Abu Kamal in Syria.
More recently, Bahrain hosted an international conference to identify and adopt measures to counter the financing 
of terrorist organisations and to develop an implementation plan as part of the coalition campaign to defeat ISIL.12 
Bahrain continues to be listed by US Central Command as a partner nation carrying out airstrikes in Syria.
Belgium
On 26 September, the Belgian Parliament voted to commit six F-16 fighter jets and 120 soldiers to support coalition 
operations in Iraq in Operation Desert Falcon. Even before the full parliament had voted in what was expected 
to be a large majority in support of the deployment, Belgium flew six F-16s to Azraq Air Base in Jordan to join the 
coalition campaign.13 
Belgium conducted its first mission as part of the coalition on 1 October and launched its first airstrike against ISIL 
on 5 October using precision weapons. Since starting operations, the Belgian force has carried out about 60 flights 
(mainly for reconnaissance) and bombed a number of ISIL targets, including an armoured jeep and a factory 
manufacturing improvised explosive devices (IEDs).14 
On 7 November, following a proposal put forward by Defence Minister Steven Vandeput, the Belgian cabinet decided 
to extend Belgium’s participation in the campaign until 31 December.15 
Canada
On 5 September, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that several dozen members of the 
Canadian Armed Forces would join the US in advising Iraqi security forces. The Canadian Parliament voted by an 
overwhelming majority to commit Canadian forces (six CF-188 Hornet fighter aircraft) to the coalition campaign. On 
2 November, Canada conducted its first airstrikes in Iraq as part of Operation Impact.
At 19 November, the Canadian Air Task Force—Iraq had flown 103 sorties, conducting preplanned strikes on ISIL 
fighting positions and warehouse facilities. It has also conducted air-to-air refuelling with a CC-150 Polaris and 
delivered an estimated 28,000 pounds of fuel. Canada has deployed around 600 armed forces personnel, including 
the air task force, liaison officers and support elements, such as command and control personnel.16 
Denmark
On September 26, Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt confirmed that Denmark would contribute seven 
fighter jets to the coalition airstrike campaign. On 2 October, the Danish Parliament voted to send the aircraft to 
conduct operations in Iraq, but not Syria. Denmark conducted its first mission against ISIL in Iraq on 16 October, 
but no weapons were dropped. Denmark has also agreed to provide 120 military trainers to advise and assist Iraqi 
security forces.17 
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France
Following a request from the Iraqi Government, France was the first coalition nation to join the US in airstrikes 
against ISIL in Iraq on 19 September.18 As part of Opération Chammal,19 the French Air Force has been carrying out 
strikes in support of Iraqi and Kurdish forces, collecting intelligence and destroying ISIL targets.
The French appear to be planning for a long-term commitment to the campaign. Their contribution is built around 
nine Rafale fighter aircraft, one Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft, one C-135FR tanker, and the anti-aircraft frigate 
Jean Bart integrated into the American carrier battle group in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. In December, France 
will deploy six Mirage fighter jets to Jordan. This will enhance France’s capacity to strengthen and adapt its mission 
for the long term.20
Jordan
Jordan joined the airstrike campaign against ISIL with the participation of its warplanes in airstrikes in Syria on the 
night of 22 September. Jordanian Information Minister Mohamed al-Momani stated that Jordan would ‘do whatever 
necessary to preserve the safety and security of [its] land’. Jordan joined the international coalition to stop the 
advance of ISIL and to prevent it from reaching Jordanian territory.21 
Jordan is currently listed by US Central Command as a partner nation undertaking airstrikes in Syria.
The Netherlands
The Netherlands joined the international coalition campaign against ISIL on 24 September, announcing that it would 
contribute six F-16 fighter jets (and two spares) for missions in Iraq. It made its first strikes in Iraq on 7 October 
alongside the UK and the US, striking ISIL targets east of Fallujah, west and northwest of Ramadi, and northeast of 
Sinjar and Sinjar Mountain in Iraq.
The Dutch have deployed 250 military personnel to carry out airstrikes and an additional 130 to advise and assist 
Iraqi and Kurdish forces. At this stage, the Netherlands has indicated that it will maintain its strike mission in Iraq for 
up to 12 months.22 
Saudi Arabia
Following King Abdullah’s commitment on 26 June to take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect Saudi Arabia against 
militants, Saudi Arabia joined the coalition campaign against ISIL on 22 September. It sent four F-16 fighter jets to 
carry out its first airstrikes on ISIL targets in eastern Syria on 22 and 23 September.23 
Saudi Arabia continues to be listed by US Central Command as a coalition partner nation contributing to airstrikes 
in Syria.
United Arab Emirates
The UAE Government confirmed its participation in airstrikes on the night of 22 September.24 It has contributed F-16 
Falcons to the campaign and hosts coalition aircraft from bases such as al-Dhafra, which has launched more strike 
aircraft than any other base or facility in the region, including the US Air Force’s F-22 Raptors.25 
The UAE continues to be listed by US Central Command as a coalition partner nation contributing to the strikes 
in Syria.
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United Kingdom
On 26 September, British Prime Minister David Cameron sought parliamentary approval for the UK to join the 
coalition campaign.26 Four days after parliament backed military action, the RAF flew its first missions in Iraq on 
30 September and 1 October as part of Operation Shader. Since then, Britain has conducted multiple airstrikes in 
Iraq using Tornado GR4 aircraft. It has also contributed other aircraft to the campaign, including Voyager refuelling 
tankers and Rivet Joint and Reaper remotely piloted aircraft.27 
United States
The first US strikes in Iraq on 8 August aimed to protect US personnel and achieve humanitarian ends, and the US 
refused to expand its airstrike operation against ISIL until the then Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, stepped 
down. Following al-Maliki’s resignation on 14 August, US President Barack Obama announced the US-led coalition 
strategy to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL’, resulting in an expansion of US strikes targeting ISIL strongholds 
in Iraq. As foreshadowed in Obama’s announcement, on 22 September the US began its air campaign against ISIL in 
Syria.28 On 16 October, the US named its campaign Operation Inherent Resolve.29 
The US continues to lead the coalition campaign against ISIL. From 12 to 21 November, it hosted a counter-ISIL 
operational planning conference featuring military planners from 33 nations at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida to 
synchronise and refine coalition campaign plans against ISIL.30 At the time of writing, the US and partner nations 
have conducted around 1,000 airstrikes in Iraq and Syria.
Others
Qatari aircraft contributed to the campaign from 22 to 23 September in a support, rather than strike, capacity, but 
Qatar has since been removed from US Central Command’s airstrike coalition partner lists.31 
Figure 2: Coalition contributing countries (humanitarian and military aid)
Compiled by author from various open sources.
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CHAPTER 5
According to the data: the first 100 days
Daniel Nichola
On 7 August 2014, US President Barack Obama authorised two operations in Iraq: targeted airstrikes to protect US 
personnel and—at the request of the Iraqi Government—a humanitarian effort to assist Iraqi civilians on Mount 
Sinjar.1 The following day, the US carried out three airstrikes near Erbil, an Iraqi city about 350 kilometres north of 
Baghdad. At the time of writing, the US and its coalition partners have conducted almost 1,000 airstrikes across 
Iraq and Syria. The strikes are a key component of the US-led strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL, and 
they’ve generated plenty of coverage and commentary. Based on publicly available information from US Central 
Command2 and other coalition governments, this section of the report provides an overview of the first 100 days of 
the campaign, detailing strike patterns in intensity, location, purpose and effect.
US airstrikes commenced on 8 August to halt ISIL’s advance on Erbil and to protect American diplomats and civilians 
serving at the US consulate and American military personnel advising Iraqi forces in that city. Using F/A-18 aircraft 
and 500-pound laser-guided bombs, the US conducted three airstrikes against ISIL vehicles, a mortar position and 
a mobile artillery piece. On 9 August, using a mix of fighter and remotely piloted aircraft, the US conducted four 
airstrikes to protect civilians trapped on Mount Sinjar and to help break the ISIL siege there. In the subsequent week, 
US aircraft continued to strike areas around Erbil and Sinjar, destroying mainly ISIL vehicles (including armoured 
personnel carriers, armed trucks and Humvees) as well as a couple of ISIL checkpoints and mortar positions. In the 
first week of the campaign, 26 airstrikes were carried out in the vicinity of Erbil and Sinjar.
On 16 August, the focus of US airstrikes shifted to the area around the Mosul Dam (Iraq’s largest dam) on the Tigris 
River upstream of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city. ISIL fighters had seized the dam on 7 August, leading to fears 
that they could flood Mosul and other cities or cut off vital water and electricity supplies. From 16 to 18 August, a 
mix of US fighter, bomber and remotely piloted aircraft carried out about 36 airstrikes near the dam, destroying 
ISIL vehicles, fighting positions and artillery and weaponry (including IED emplacements and vehicle-mounted 
anti-aircraft artillery). On 18 August, President Obama declared that Iraqi and Kurdish forces had recaptured the 
Mosul Dam with the support of US airstrikes.3 
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Figure 4: The first 100 days—coalition airstrikes in Iraq
Based on data sourced from US Central Command news releases, 8 August to 24 November 2014, online.
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US airstrikes continued to focus on the area around the Mosul Dam from 19 August to 5 September, albeit with less 
intensity. In that 17-day period, the US conducted around 49 airstrikes near the dam (14 of them on 20 August) to 
support operations by Iraqi security forces and Kurdish fighters. Concurrently, a mix of US attack and remotely 
piloted aircraft carried out approximately six strikes near Erbil, targeting ISIL vehicles (between 24 and 27 August 
and on 4–5 September).
Also during this period, at the request of the Iraqi Government, the US conducted airstrikes near Amirli in support of an 
operation to deliver humanitarian assistance to that town. As part of their June offensive, ISIL militants had advanced 
on Amirli and cut off food, water and medical supplies to the population there. On 30 August, two US C-17 and two 
US C-130 transport aircraft dropped 109 bundles of humanitarian aid to the people of Amirli, delivering around 
10,500 gallons of fresh drinking water and 7,000 ready-to-eat meals. Aircraft from Australia, France and the UK also 
dropped humanitarian aid. To support this operation, US fighter aircraft carried out three airstrikes near Amirli in 
coordination with Iraqi security forces, destroying ISIL vehicles, including Humvees and a tank.4 On 31 August, Iraqi 
troops and militias, aided by US airstrikes, raised the two-month siege of the town.5 
From 6 September, the US expanded its airstrike campaign to target ISIL fighters threatening the Haditha Dam—
the largest dam on the Euphrates River, in the western Iraqi province of Anbar. Iraqi security forces and local tribes 
had been battling ISIL in the area since January, when ISIL took control of Fallujah and most of Anbar Province. On 
6 September, at the request of the Iraqi Government, a mix of US fighter and bomber aircraft conducted four airstrikes 
near Haditha in support of Iraqi security forces and Sunni tribes protecting the dam. The strikes destroyed ISIL vehicles 
and a checkpoint and damaged an ISIL bunker. From 6 to 9 September, the US carried out nine airstrikes near the 
Haditha Dam, targeting mainly ISIL vehicles, including some transporting anti-aircraft artillery.
During this period, the US also continued to conduct airstrikes near Erbil (six airstrikes from 4 to 9 September) and 
near the Mosul Dam (one airstrike on 6 September). These strikes exclusively targeted ISIL vehicles (Humvees, trucks, 
armed vehicles and one armoured personnel carrier).
On 10 September, President Obama announced his administration’s strategy to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL’. 
The President foreshadowed an expansion of US efforts in Iraq beyond humanitarian missions and protecting US 
citizens to include ‘hitting ISIL targets as Iraqi forces go on offense’. President Obama also announced his intention to 
‘take action against ISIL in Syria’.6 
As part of these expanded efforts, on 14 September the US commenced airstrikes in the vicinity of Baghdad. From 14 
to 19 September, a mix of US bomber, fighter, attack and remotely piloted aircraft carried out 11 airstrikes southeast 
and southwest of the city. The strikes targeted ISIL ground units and fighting positions, ISIL-occupied buildings and 
vehicles, artillery and ammunition stockpiles, and four small boats on the Euphrates River that were resupplying ISIL 
forces in the area.
Following President Obama’s call for an expanded campaign, on 19 September French Rafale fighter aircraft carried 
out strikes in northeast Iraq (the first strikes by a coalition partner of the US).7 France’s Defence Ministry confirmed 
that the strikes destroyed an ISIL logistics depot that contained vehicles, weapons and fuel.8 A spokesman for the 
Iraqi military stated that four French airstrikes had hit the town of Zumar.9 
As part of its expanded efforts in Iraq, on 22 September the US also conducted its first airstrikes near Kirkuk, a town 
about 230 kilometres north of Baghdad contested by ISIL and Kurdish forces since June.10 A mix of US attack, fighter 
and remotely piloted aircraft carried out four airstrikes, destroying ISIL vehicles and a tank.
From 22 September, the airstrike campaign extended to Syria when the US, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE carried out 14 strikes against ISIL targets using a mix of fighter, bomber and remotely piloted aircraft. 
The US also launched 47 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles from the guided-missile destroyer USS Arleigh Burke 
and the guided-missile cruiser USS Philippine Sea operating in international waters in the Red Sea and northern 
Arabian Gulf as part of the USS George HW Bush carrier strike group. These strikes destroyed or damaged multiple ISIL 
targets in the vicinity of Raqqah, Deir ez-Zor, al-Hasakah and Abu Kamal, including ISIL fighters, training compounds, 
headquarters, command and control facilities, storage facilities, a finance centre, supply trucks and armed vehicles.
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Figure 5: The first 100 days—coalition airstrikes in Syria
Based on data sourced from US Central Command news releases, 8 August to 24 November 2014, online.
On the same night, the US also conducted eight strikes in Syria west of Aleppo against the so-called Khorasan 
Group to ‘disrupt the imminent attack plotting [sic] against the United States and Western interests’.11 These strikes 
targeted training camps, an explosives and munitions production facility, a communication building and command 
and control facilities.
The coalition campaign has struck ISIL targets in both Iraq and Syria almost every day since 22 September.
On 24 September, the focus of US and partner nation airstrikes in Syria shifted to modular oil refineries providing 
fuel for ISIL operations and helping to finance the group’s activity. Using a mix of fighter and remotely piloted 
aircraft, the US, Saudi Arabia and the UAE carried out 13 airstrikes against 12 ISIL-controlled modular oil refineries in 
remote areas of eastern Syria near al-Mayadin, al-Hasakah and Abu Kamal.
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In Iraq, airstrikes continued to hit locations and targets similar to those in previous weeks. From 22 to 30 September, 
the US conducted 44 airstrikes against targets near Baghdad (11 airstrikes), Erbil (6), Kirkuk (11), Fallujah (4), Sinjar / 
northwest Iraq (9), the Mosul Dam (2) and al-Qaim (1). These strikes mainly destroyed ISIL vehicles, fighting positions 
and checkpoints. On 25 September, France conducted its second sequence of airstrikes in Iraq, targeting four 
ISIL-controlled hangars containing military equipment near Fallujah.12 
In Syria during this period, coalition airstrikes targeted mainly ISIL-controlled infrastructure, in contrast to the 
mainly mobile targets in Iraq. From 26 to 29 September, the US and various combinations of Saudi Arabian, UAE 
and Jordanian aircraft carried out 27 strikes in northern and eastern Syria near al-Hasakah (5 airstrikes), Manbij 
(3), Kobane (2), Raqqah (8), Deir ez-Zor (7) and Aleppo (2). These strikes destroyed ISIL buildings and compounds, 
command and control facilities, modular oil refineries, training camps, garrisons, vehicles and tanks and struck two 
ISIL-held airfields (one near Raqqah and the other in northwest Syria near Aleppo).
This period also marked the beginning of coalition airstrikes near Kobane, northeast of Aleppo on the Syria–Turkey 
border. Kurdish forces in the area had been fighting to halt ISIL’s advance towards Kobane since 15 September.13 
On 26–27 September, the US (with the participation of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAE) conducted two airstrikes 
at the Kobane border crossing. A mix of fighter and remotely piloted aircraft destroyed an ISIL building and two 
armed vehicles. On 29–30 September, the US (without the participation of Arab coalition partners) carried out 
three airstrikes near Mazra al-Duwud, about a kilometre outside of Kobane, destroying one artillery piece and 
damaging another, and destroying two rocket launchers. The US conducted a further three airstrikes near Kobane 
on 30 September to 1 October, destroying one armed vehicle, an artillery piece and a tank.
On 30 September, the UK conducted its first airstrikes in Iraq. Two RAF Tornado GR4 attack aircraft conducted 
two strikes in northwest Iraq to assist Kurdish troops. One Paveway IV guided bomb was dropped on an ISIL 
heavy weapon position engaging Kurdish ground forces, and a Brimstone missile struck an armed pick-up truck.14 
Concurrently, the US also carried out 11 airstrikes in Iraq and 11 airstrikes in Syria (without the participation of Arab 
coalition partners). These 24 coalition airstrikes across Iraq and Syria mark 29 and 30 September as two of the most 
active days of the campaign to date.
In the first week of October, the focus of airstrikes in Syria shifted to Kobane. From 1 to 7 October, the US and 
differing combinations of Jordan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia carried out 11 airstrikes near Kobane to destroy mainly 
mobile targets, including ISIL checkpoints, fighting positions and vehicles. During this period, the US and its Arab 
coalition partners also continued airstrikes on other ISIL strongholds in Syria, carrying out 24 airstrikes near Raqqah 
(8 airstrikes), Deir ez-Zor (5), al-Hasakah (5), Aleppo (2), Tabqah airfield (2), Rabiyah (1) and al-Mayadin (1). Following 
the pattern of previous airstrikes in Syria, these strikes targeted mainly ISIL-controlled buildings and facilities.
On 5–6 October, the US launched its first strikes in Iraq using rotary-wing aircraft. While details were not reported 
officially, the helicopters were likely to have been AH-64 Apaches operated by the US Army out of Baghdad 
International Airport.15 
This period also saw other coalition partners commence airstrikes in Iraq. On 6–7 October, Belgium conducted 
its first airstrikes with the US northeast of Sinjar. On 7–8 October, the Netherlands carried out five airstrikes near 
Fallujah, Ramadi and Sinjar with the US and the UK. Australia conducted its first strikes in Iraq on 8 October, 
destroying an ISIL facility. On 16 October, Danish aircraft participated in their first mission over northern Iraq, but 
did not conduct any strikes.16 
From 7 October, airstrikes in Kobane intensified. From 7 to 13 October, the US, Saudi Arabia and the UAE carried 
out 43 airstrikes near the border town, targeting mainly ISIL fighting units, staging facilities and vehicles. On 13 and 
14 October, in two of the most active days of the campaign to date, the US and Saudi Arabia conducted 22 airstrikes 
near Kobane to interdict ISIL reinforcements and resupply and to prevent ISIL from massing combat power against 
the Kurdish-held parts of the town. These strikes targeted mainly ISIL compounds and staging facilities. From 14 to 
17 October, the US (without Arab coalition partners) carried out a further 38 airstrikes near Kobane for this purpose, 
targeting mainly ISIL-occupied buildings and fighting positions.
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At the request of the Iraqi Government, on 10 and 11 October the US conducted multiple airdrops in the vicinity of 
Bayji, a city about 220 kilometres north of Baghdad on the main road to Mosul. ISIL fighters had seized Bayji in June, 
threatening to capture the city’s oil refinery, which is the largest in Iraq.17 US aircraft dropped 36 container delivery 
system bundles containing 7,328 halal meals, 2,065 gallons of water and 16,000 pounds of ammunition to resupply 
Iraqi security forces engaging ISIL fighters in the area.18 
From 16 to 18 October, the focus of US airstrikes in Syria shifted to ISIL-controlled oil assets in order to degrade 
ISIL’s financing capacity. The US carried out 14 airstrikes in eastern Syria, targeting ISIL’s oil production, collection, 
storage and transportation infrastructure. A mix of US fighter and bomber aircraft struck ISIL oil collection 
equipment near Shadadi, including several petroleum, oil and lubricant tanks and a pump station; an ISIL military 
camp southwest of Ain Aissa; a modular oil refinery southeast of Deir ez-Zor; a crude oil collection point, crude oil 
collection equipment and a modular oil refinery east of Dhiban; a crude oil collection point northeast of Khusham; 
and a modular oil refinery east of Sharra.
In Iraq from 16 October, the coalition increased strikes in the vicinity of Bayji. The US first conducted airstrikes near 
Bayji on 14 and 15 October, targeting an ISIL building, a Humvee, a machine gun and an artillery piece with four 
airstrikes. From 16 to 19 October, the US, France, the UK and an unidentified partner nation carried out 10 strikes 
near Bayji, targeting mainly ISIL vehicles, fighting positions and facilities.
On 19 October, US C-130 transport aircraft conducted multiple airdrops in the vicinity of Kobane to resupply Kurdish 
forces defending the city against ISIL. The aircraft delivered weapons, ammunition and medical supplies that were 
provided by Kurdish authorities in Iraq. On the same day, the US confirmed that its forces had conducted more than 
135 airstrikes against ISIL in Kobane and that there were indications that these strikes had ‘slowed ISIL advances 
into the city, killed hundreds of their fighters and destroyed or damaged scores of pieces of ISIL combat equipment 
and fighting positions’. However, US Central Command noted that the security situation in Kobane ‘remains fragile’ 
and that the town ‘could still fall’.19 
Also on 18–19 October, the US struck and destroyed an earthen berm (or land bridge) southwest of Fallujah near 
the Fallujah Dam. The berm was built by ISIL to increase the flow of the Euphrates River into Abu Ghraib canals, 
which flooded civilian neighbourhoods in east Fallujah and forced the locals to evacuate. The berm also enabled 
ISIL to control downstream water supplies to surrounding areas. At the request of the Iraqi Government, US bomber 
aircraft destroyed the berm, which the US deemed a legitimate military target.20 
From 18 to 25 October in Syria, the US and its coalition partners continued to focus airstrikes around Kobane. 
On 18 and 19 October, the US, the UAE and Saudi Arabia conducted 11 airstrikes near Kobane, destroying 20 ISIL 
fighting positions, two ISIL-held buildings and five vehicles. From 19 to 25 October, the US carried out a further 
27 strikes near Kobane using a mix of bomber, fighter and attack aircraft. The strikes targeted mainly ISIL units 
and fighting positions.
In Iraq during this period, coalition airstrikes focused on targets near Fallujah, Bayji and the Mosul Dam. From 18 to 
25 October, the US and unidentified partner nations21 carried out 32 airstrikes near the Mosul Dam, targeting mainly 
ISIL fighting positions and staging locations; 19 airstrikes near Fallujah, targeting mainly ISIL units and vehicles as 
well as destroying an ISIL training facility and suppressing an ISIL attack (on 20–21 October); and 14 airstrikes near 
Bayji, targeting mainly ISIL units, fighting positions, buildings and an ISIL training camp as well as destroying four 
ISIL boats and damaging at least four others.
From 25 to 31 October, US airstrikes in Syria continued to focus on Kobane. Using a mix of fighter, bomber and 
attack aircraft, the US (without Arab coalition partners) carried out 35 airstrikes near the town, targeting mainly ISIL 
units, fighting positions, buildings and vehicles. In Iraq, most coalition airstrikes continued to target the areas near 
Fallujah, Bayji and the Mosul Dam, but with less intensity than in the previous week. The US and unidentified partner 
nations conducted 16 airstrikes near the Mosul Dam, targeting ISIL vehicles, units and buildings; 10 airstrikes near 
Fallujah, targeting mainly ISIL units; and four airstrikes near Bayji, targeting mainly ISIL units and vehicles.
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From 31 October to 7 November, target and location trends largely continued, but the number of strikes decreased 
further. In Syria, the US and Arab coalition partners (absent from strikes since 18–19 October) conducted 
24 airstrikes near Kobane, targeting mainly ISIL units and fighting positions as well as a dump truck used to 
construct fighting positions. In Iraq, US and unidentified partner nations carried out relatively small numbers of 
strikes on various locations near the Mosul Dam (2 airstrikes), al-Qaim (4), Bayji (7), Fallujah (8), Sinjar (2) and Ramadi 
(5). These strikes targeted mainly ISIL units and vehicles, as well as destroying seven bulldozers and a dump truck 
involved in creating obstructions and berms near Fallujah. On 2 November, Canada launched its first airstrikes in 
Iraq, involving two CF-188 fighter aircraft dropping GBU-12 500-pound laser-guided bombs near Fallujah.22 
On the night of 5 November, the US carried out its second wave of strikes on the Khorasan Group. In the vicinity 
of Sarmada, a town about 50 kilometres west of Aleppo, a mix of US bomber, fighter and remotely piloted aircraft 
struck five Khorasan Group targets, including individuals and several vehicles and buildings assessed to be meeting 
and staging areas, IED-making facilities and training facilities. US Central Command noted that the group was 
‘plotting to attack in Europe or the homeland’.23 
From 7 to 14 November, coalition airstrikes increased markedly from the previous week. The US and Arab coalition 
nations again targeted ISIL oil collection equipment and infrastructure in Syria. Sixteen coalition airstrikes hit 
ISIL-controlled oil collection facilities near Deir ez-Zor (14 airstrikes) and al-Hasakah (two airstrikes). Also in Syria 
in this period, the US and unidentified Arab coalition nations again increased airstrikes on Kobane, carrying out 
40 strikes near the town and targeting mainly ISIL units and fighting positions. From 12 to 14 November, the US 
conducted a further strike on the Khorasan Group in northwest Syria west of Aleppo, targeting people associated 
with the network.
In Iraq during this period, the US and its coalition partners increased strikes near Kirkuk and continued regular 
strikes near Bayji. From 7 to 14 November, the US and unidentified partner nations launched 10 airstrikes near 
Kirkuk, targeting mainly ISIL units as well as a weapons bunker. Near Bayji, the US and unidentified partner nations 
carried out 15 airstrikes, targeting mainly ISIL units and vehicles as well as destroying two sniper positions.
From 14 to 24 November in Iraq, coalition airstrikes continued to focus on Kirkuk. The US and unidentified partner 
nations conducted 21 airstrikes in the vicinity of the town, targeting mainly ISIL staging areas and fighting positions 
and destroying five bunkers and a tunnel. Regular coalition airstrikes continued near Bayji (14 airstrikes), targeting 
mainly ISIL units and fighting positions. The US and unidentified partner nations also launched 18 airstrikes near 
Mosul, targeting mainly ISIL units and vehicles, and four near Sinjar that destroyed two barracks, a bunker, a storage 
facility, a guard post, two ISIL units, at least eight armoured vehicles and a truck in a vehicle storage yard. A mix of 
US and partner-nation fighter, attack, bomber and remotely piloted aircraft also damaged an ISIL-occupied airfield 
in a strike in Tal Afar.
In Syria from 14 to 24 November, the US and Arab coalition nations continued to focus on Kobane, carrying out 
27 airstrikes near the town and targeting mainly ISIL units, fighting positions and staging areas. The coalition again 
targeted ISIL oil collection equipment and infrastructure in Syria. From 14 to 21 November, three airstrikes launched 
by the US and Arab coalition nations hit ISIL-controlled oil collection facilities near Deir ez-Zor (two airstrikes) and 
al-Hasakah (one airstrike). From 17 to 19 November, the US conducted another strike on the Khorasan Group in 
northwest Syria near Haram, destroying a storage facility associated with the network.
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Figure 6: The first 100 days—coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria 
Based on data sourced from US Central Command news releases, 8 August to 24 November 2014, online.
On our count, in just over 100 days from the first US airstrikes near Erbil to the time of writing (8 August to 
24 November), the US-led coalition launched 999 airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. Of those 999, 435 struck in Syria and 
564 in Iraq (see Figure 6 above and also Appendix 2 to this report).
In total, coalition airstrikes targeted 597 ISIL vehicles; 428 ISIL units, fighting positions and mortar positions; 
332 ISIL buildings, structures and facilities (including checkpoints, camps and training facilities); 48 ISIL armaments 
components (including weapons caches, ammunition stockpiles and artillery pieces); and 40 ISIL oil refineries, 
collection points and stores (see also Appendix 2 to this report).
With some ebb and flow, the pattern of coalition airstrikes during the first 100 days has been relatively limited 
yet increasing in number (see Figure 7 below). Since the spike when strikes commenced in Syria, the coalition has 
launched an average of about 94 airstrikes per week (about 13 per day). Current indications suggest that coalition 
airstrikes will continue this trend, as the US continues to signal its intention to lead the anti-ISIL campaign ‘through 
a steady, relentless effort to take out ISIL wherever they exist, using our air power and our support for partner forces 
on the ground’.24 
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Figure 7: The first 100 days—total weekly airstrikes 
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CHAPTER 6
The cost of operations against ISIL
Mark Thomson
An official estimate of the cost of Australian operations against ISIL awaits the release of the government’s mid-year 
budget update.1 However, in mid-September, the Prime Minister provided a ‘ballpark’ figure of ‘about a quarter of 
a billion [dollars] every six months’, or around $500 million a year.2 On past experience, the final figure may be less; 
ADF operations in Iraq between 2002 to 2008 cost in the vicinity of $400 million to $600 million a year, yet involved a 
significantly larger contingent than is currently deployed.
In comparison, Australian operations in Afghanistan cost between $1 billion and $1.6 billion per year between 
2006 and 2013. But our contribution to operations against ISIL is smaller and less logistically difficult than our 
deployment to Afghanistan. Indeed, the cost of operations in and around Iraq is moderated by access to established 
infrastructure and pre-existing supply lines.
Even if the cost does reach $500 million a year, it will still only amount to less than 2% of Defence’s annual 
$29.3 billion budget. It remains to be seen how much of the additional cost will be absorbed from within Defence’s 
base funding. By convention, the government usually (though not always) supplements Defence for the net 
additional cost of deployments.
From the perspective of the federal budget, half a billion dollars represents just 0.12% of annual outlays.3 More 
importantly, the current fiscal situation makes it unlikely that $500 million will be the difference between surplus 
and deficit over the next few years.
As the leader of the anti-ISIL coalition, the US has been spending around US$8 million per day on operations, which 
translates to US$2.9 billion a year.4 However, in November the White House requested US$5.6 billion to cover the 
cost of operations against ISIL in 2015—still less than 1% of the Pentagon’s FY15 budget of US$575 billion and only 
8% of its US$71 billion war funding component.5 
The relatively low cost of operations against ISIL for both Australia and the US reflects the limited scale of the 
endeavour. It’s a carefully targeted campaign with high reliance on air power to support Iraqi ground forces. If 
successful, the strategy will have been remarkably cost-effective.
Financial measures rarely capture the total cost of armed conflict. There’s always an unavoidable opportunity cost 
in not having assets available for other contingencies. In the case of Australia’s commitment, the eight-aircraft Air 
Task Group and 200-strong Special Operations Task Group are unavailable for other missions. However, in each 
case, the deployed elements are only a small fraction of their type in the ADF. It’s very unlikely that a contingency 
will arise that would make their absence felt. Conversely, and more importantly, the ADF elements deployed in the 
international coalition against ISIL are gaining valuable experience far beyond what might otherwise be achieved in 
peacetime training.
More generally, the costs incurred by Australia are more than offset by the prospect of destroying the scourge of ISIL 
while, at the same time, strengthening our relationships with allies and partners.
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CHAPTER 7
The advise and assist mission: land forces on the ground
Ken Gleiman
The US has had combat advisers in Iraq since August 2014; however, Australian special operations forces joined 
Operation Inherent Resolve on the ground in mid-November. The initial 200-man Australian element joined a force 
of advisers from various countries that are part of the official coalition. They also find themselves dealing with the 
reality of other influences on the ground, the most notable being the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds force.
While much of the media focus has been on airstrikes and air power, the land component advisory force has been 
busy setting the conditions for the current and future efforts of the Iraqi security forces to force ISIL out of Iraq and 
reassert control over Iraqi territory and its population. These ‘advise and assist’ efforts have been constrained by 
restrictions on activity and complicated by the armed politics of a fragile and broken Iraq. We’re already seeing how 
some of these trends and tactical pressures are forcing operational and strategic decisions, including the recent 
addition of 1,500 more US troops and the request directly from President Obama to Prime Minister Tony Abbott for 
more Australian advisers.
One of the first things that an advisory force must do is make an assessment of the units that they will advise. 
Because the US and other coalition partners were already on the ground before the arrival of Australian special 
operations forces, much of the initial assessment of the Iraqi forces was already done. The Australian adviser force 
received reports providing it with the right information for planning and preparation. According to official ADF 
sources, the Australian advisers are working with the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service. The service is an independent 
agency of the Iraqi Government that works directly for the prime minister. The Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF) 
is the primary operational arm of the service.
The ISOF is probably Iraq’s most trusted and capable military unit. However, when Iraqi Army units disintegrated 
en masse earlier this year, the ISOF brigades held together and were forced to do much of the fighting. As a result, 
they’ve suffered a very high attrition rate and by some accounts are at 50% strength. Therefore, the Australian 
advisers face a severely weakened unit with a core cadre of capable and experienced fighters and a lot of 
inexperienced replacements. Much like business consultants hired by a once profitable corporation, Australian 
special operations forces have to establish trust and rapport with these experienced soldiers and officers. They’ll 
need to focus on assisting the unit with its systems and processes. This will probably include advice and assistance 
on operations, but, more importantly, it will include efforts to sustain the organisation in the long run. Logistics, 
maintenance, personnel systems and the training of replacements are likely to demand the time and effort of the 
Australian advisers in the near term.
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To accompany or not to accompany?
The current dataset on the airstrikes demonstrates that ISIL has been degraded and has adapted. In the first 
several weeks of airstrikes, coalition forces destroyed numerous tanks, armoured personnel carriers and other 
armed vehicles, often in convoys or groups of more than five. After several weeks, however, particularly around 
the beginning of October, the coalition began targeting more static positions, including suspected headquarters, 
checkpoints, fighting positions and key assets associated with energy infrastructure. This trend in targeting 
indicates both the effectiveness of the targeting and the probable adaptation of ISIL forces. As their higher end 
assets were destroyed, ISIL commanders recognised that convoys of multiple vehicles and high-signature armoured 
vehicles provided easy targets for coalition air power. They’ve clearly dispersed their forces and concealed any 
remaining armoured assets. ISIL still holds key terrain and will likely defend much of it, or return to guerrilla action 
and insurgent attacks after Iraqi security forces have seized territory. This change in tactics will make airstrikes 
less effective over time and increase the demand from Iraqi security forces leaders and their advisers for close air 
support directed by tactical air controllers embedded with ground units.
Such a shift will require a revision of current constraints, which only allow advisers to be physically present at 
battalion headquarters and above. To continue to take advantage of coalition air power in the subsequent phases 
of Operation Inherent Resolve, this minor change in tactics is appropriate and likely. There will be some domestic 
challenges to explain the intentional proximity of advisers to combat. The promises of ‘no boots on the ground’ and 
coalition soldiers not being involved in combat will have to be modified.
In addition to providing more effective air support, allowing advisers to accompany their Iraqi counterparts will help 
to moderate the influence of Iranian Quds force operatives and their increasingly powerful Shia militias. Quds force 
advisers have been accompanying their militia counterparts and lending direct combat advice and support during 
offensive operations for several months, even before coalition airstrikes began.
Western coalition advisers working with ISOF and Iraqi Army units will be able to boost the influence of official state 
organisations and counter the armed political influence of militias only if they can have the operational and tactical 
flexibility to accompany their counterparts and ensure their success on the battlefield. If the Iranian-advised militias 
are permitted to seize more territory, they’ll probably extract a painful price from Sunni minority communities 
(several already have) and will have even more political capital in post-ISIL Iraq.1 To ensure that Iraqi state 
institutions recover their credibility, the Iraqi Army needs to achieve tactical success and demonstrate that it can 
secure Sunni areas and incorporate Sunni tribal militias in a manner that will encourage more Sunnis to reject ISIL 
and work with the government.
A slightly heavier ‘light’ footprint
Immediately following the US mid-term congressional elections, the US administration authorised the deployment 
of an additional 1,500 combat advisers to Iraq. This increases the US footprint to around 3,000 soldiers. Part of 
President Obama’s iterative strategy, this action probably resulted from an operational decision point that had two 
criteria. The first was a reduction in the targeting pay-off of airstrikes demonstrating that ISIL forces were being 
degraded or some similar indication of a halt to ISIL momentum (the data suggests in about October). The second 
criterion was a clear indication and commitment from the new government of Haider al-Abadi to work with and 
support Sunnis who turn against the ISIL forces. The administration probably made the decision in mid-October, 
but waited until after the mid-terms to make the announcement. This is clearly not a short-term effort, but 
represents a long-term commitment to the post-ISIL foreign internal defence campaign for Iraq, based on the ‘light 
footprint’ model.2 The US administration is clearly rejecting large-scale assistance efforts executed over a hurried 
timeline, as were seen during Operation Iraqi Freedom and its sequel, Operation New Dawn. The new strategy will 
be characterised by limited advice and assistance over a long period, which will be contingent on political decisions.
These new forces will be responsible for training and advising 12 Iraqi brigades, some of which will reinforce and 
resecure Anbar, the Sunni-dominated province that makes up much of western Iraq. The US-led coalition currently 
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has no advisers in Anbar, and it would be unwise and perhaps unthinkable to allow Shia-dominated militias to enter 
the province. The US initially refused to send advisers to Iraqi security force elements in this ISIL stronghold until the 
Abadi government agreed to arm Sunni tribes who agree to fight ISIL. This has been the most understated quality of 
the Obama strategy, which was characterised by the withholding of support to influence Iraqi leaders to take steps 
that will set the conditions for a post-ISIL Iraq. That method first manifested itself when the Obama administration 
withheld US military support until Nouri Al-Maliki resigned and a new government was formed. In early November, 
Abadi’s new Defence Minister, Khaled al-Obaidi, sacked 36 ineffectual officers from the ranks of the Iraqi Army, 
signalling reform and accountability. This announcement coincided with the US announcement of more advisers 
and a stepped-up assistance effort.3 
At this time, one ISOF battalion remains in ISIL-controlled Ramadi, fighting to retain its foothold (Australian advisers 
may join them.) The coalition will soon initiate a program to arm Sunni groups willing to ally with the government. 
Arming Sunnis in Anbar will give them influence in the armed politics of Iraq, but could also backfire, setting 
conditions for further sectarian war and violence. Advisers will find themselves in the middle of these highly charged 
political situations and will have to work with the Iraqi state security forces to ensure that Sunnis are respected in 
post-ISIL Iraq and that Shia-dominated security force elements and militia pursue the government’s objectives 
rather than sectarian ones.
The question of Syria
The civil war in Syria is an integral part of the strategic environment in Iraq. It’s clear that the coalition has 
adopted an ‘Iraq first’ strategy, but it’s equally clear the objective of destroying ISIL can’t be completed without 
an appropriate branch plan for Syria. The current Syrian side of the campaign consists of a disturbingly weak and 
flawed economy-of-force effort. There appears to be growing recognition within the coalition that a Syrian sequel 
plan to the Iraq campaign requires better shaping efforts and a clear objective concerning the fate of Bashar 
al-Assad.
The US administration has adopted a timid ‘train and equip’ strategy rather than a comprehensive strategy that 
leverages unconventional warfare capability. Very few rebel groups are actually receiving any US support, and the 
most reliable of those recently surrendered to or were absorbed by al-Qaeda linked radical Islamists (the Al-Nusra 
Front).4 Unfortunately, the approach is proving to be inadequate and may actually be helping both ISIL and the 
Assad regime grow stronger within Syria. The failure to commit to a comprehensive strategy of unconventional 
warfare as early as 2012 has left the coalition in a very difficult position when it comes to setting conditions for a 
post-ISIL Syria because only three factions have a reasonable chance of reasserting state-like control of the country: 
ISIL, the Islamic Alliance (which includes al-Nusra) and the Assad regime.5
Rather than engaging directly with the sub-elements of the loose coalition of the Free Syrian Army, the US 
administration insisted on vetting the militia groups before providing any significant support or advisers. That 
process has proved too slow, inadequate, and methodologically flawed.6 Proxy forces don’t need to be ideologically 
pure or even be free from accusations of human rights violations. They just need to be willing to fight Assad, willing 
to remain independent of ISIL and al-Nusra and willing to accept advice and support from the coalition. Would any 
US proxies from the Afghan Northern Alliance in 2001 have passed the vetting process?
The minimal support that the US did send wasn’t simply not enough. Additionally, the US has decided to recruit, 
train and equip a new proxy force formed from scratch. If reports are correct, this force of 5,000 will be a pure US 
proxy force but won’t even be available for more than a year.7 While this may increase the ability of US principals to 
control their proxy agents in Syria, the proxy forces will have little credibility with other elements of the anti-Assad 
resistance and the Syrian population is unlikely to take them seriously. The US administration has already said that 
these forces would not be trained to fight ISIL or Assad, but rather to hold territory already seized, which raises the 
question: seized by whom?
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Although the non-ISIS / non-al-Qaeda rebel groups in Syria mightn’t be the ideal examples of forces we’d like to 
support, those groups have formed naturally out of the real and desperate social conditions of a civil war. Their 
members are committed to their own survival, the destruction of Assad and the future security of Syria. Like 
most groups caught in the armed politics of a civil war, they had to make their own strategic decisions, taking into 
account their own survival and the prioritisation of their ultimate goal of defeating Assad. By not supporting these 
naturally emergent groups, the US administration has all but guaranteed that they’ll fall to or be absorbed by the 
groups that have reliable sponsors and therefore the resources to ensure success. Al-Nusra, the Islamic Alliance and 
ISIL have plenty of state and non-state sponsorship and have therefore already absorbed several groups that were 
reasonably ‘moderate’, but could no longer afford to remain so.8 ISIL, al-Nusra and the Islamic Alliance have now 
joined forces and agreed to work together in a temporary tactical alliance.9 As David Killcullen recently pointed out, 
Assad was lying in 2012 when he claimed that all of the Syrian resistance elements were radical Islamic terrorists. In 
2014, however, that statement is a lot closer to the truth.10
This situation may be irreversible, but the coalition should consider reversing its decision on the Syrian opposition 
if that’s at all possible and embedding small special operations teams with what’s left of the non-ISIL, non-al-Nusra 
Syrian opposition, especially in the south near Deraa. The only way to vet the remaining forces and then influence 
their political direction is to be there on the ground with them and to interact with them on a personal level. If 
there’s any hope of splitting more moderate members of the Islamic Alliance away from al-Nusra, it must be done by 
demonstrating that remaining moderate groups like the Syrian Revolutionary Front have strength and credibility. If 
the situation’s untenable, then advisory forces should be withdrawn.
Without an effective proxy within Syria, the coalition will soon have to articulate an unpalatable sequential strategy 
for the defeat of ISIL in Syria. To keep Iranian influence in check in Iraq, the coalition may need to negotiate an 
end to the Assad regime that allows Alawite leaders and regime associates to retain some influence in the future 
government of a post-ISIL Syria. Kurds, Alawites and Sunni factions will need to be convinced about a post-Assad, 
post-ISIL political order before any decisive military action can be connected to an acceptable post-conflict political 
objective. Without this, even achieving the general destruction of ISIL won’t lead to a more secure political order.
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CHAPTER 8
ISIL and international terrorism
Tobias Feakin
Until the meteoric rise of ISIL, al-Qaeda and those inspired by its ideology had been deemed the most significant 
terrorist threat to Western states’ security. Al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, disavowed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s 
group from its ranks in the spring of 2014—after the group had previously been considered an al-Qaeda affiliate—
for failing to follow his orders. Al-Zawahiri clearly saw the group as a liability to the al-Qaeda leadership and their 
cause. Yet, following the split, ISIL achieved substantial military and geographical gains, expanding its footprint 
in northern and eastern Syria and across large parts of northern Iraq to the outskirts of Baghdad. It achieved 
something that had eluded Bin Laden—the announcement of the establishment of a caliphate in June 2014—and 
demanded that Islamist extremist groups around the world swear loyalty to al-Baghdadi. While not achieving the 
immediate reaction that ISIL may have expected, this clearly lit a fire of inspiration under those toying with the idea 
of joining the group, as foreign recruitment surged in the wake of the call, and has arguably led to ISIL becoming the 
predominant global Islamist extremist group.
There’s no doubt that the rapid rise of ISIL in Syria and especially Iraq caught the international community by 
surprise. The group had been monitored by governments in the region and the West and was considered to be a risk, 
but deemed not to be of strategic concern. However, the speed of its military success, which no Islamist extremist 
group had previously matched, meant that the international community was playing catch-up in its understanding 
of the evolving threat the group presented and what the appropriate responses might be.
Beyond the rotten domestic political situations in Syria and Iraq and the increased sectarianism permeating both 
nations, which ISIL fuelled and fed from, it’s important to examine three core contributing factors to ISIL’s growth as 
an organisation:
• ISIL’s ability to recruit large numbers of international fighters to its cause
• its understanding of how to propagate a strong social media propaganda campaign to draw and sustain support 
for its cause
• its ability to generate large financial sums to build its armoury, pay fighters and support its interpretation of 
state building.
Recruitment of foreign fighters
Around 15,000 people from at least 80 nations have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join extremist groups. Of those, it’s 
estimated that around 80% have joined ISIL, in which foreign fighters—including at least 2,000 Westerners—make 
up half the fighting ranks. Most of the foreign fighters come from Arab nations, such as Tunisia (3,000), Saudi Arabia 
(2,500), Jordan (2,089) and Morocco (1,500), but smaller contingents come from nations as far away as France (412), 
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Belgium (296), Indonesia (60) and Australia (150).1 Those are the official numbers of those who are known about, 
but the real figures may well be much higher.
The conflict in Syria and Iraq has drawn in foreign fighters at a faster rate than any past Middle Eastern conflict, 
including the Afghan War of the 1980s or recent US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to a report 
released by the UN in October, the speed at which people from outside Syria and Iraq are swarming into the territory 
is unprecedented: ‘numbers since 2010 are now many times the size of cumulative numbers of foreign terrorist 
fighters between 1990 and 2010—and are growing.’2 Following ISIL’s declaration in June that it had established its 
Islamic Caliphate, recruitment of foreign fighters was said to have surged.
Propaganda via social media—online Jihad 3.0
Over the past 15 years, we’ve seen increasing moves towards higher and diversified levels of online activity by 
Islamist extremist groups and their target audience as a mechanism for recruitment and communications. There’s 
no more powerful example than the current media campaign by ISIL, which has largely outrun governments’ ability 
to keep up. Whether it’s ISIL’s well-oiled media machine, al-Hayat, or the social media feeding frenzy of its fighters 
and supporters, the group has reached a broader audience than al-Qaeda managed to in the past. 
It’s possible to point to three key stages of development in the online activity of al-Qaeda, its affiliates and now ISIL. 
During the early to mid-2000s, the internet was a primary tool for planning operations and organising meetings 
between those involved in a network. A second evolution took place as it became a conduit for sermons and 
propaganda, and YouTube videos of jihadists in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Afghanistan became easily available. 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was perceived as the long-term leader for the way it disseminated its material to 
a global online audience through its magazine, Inspire. Its charismatic figurehead, Anwar al-Awlaki, was famed for 
his English-language YouTube sermons, blog and Facebook page, which influenced various people to carry out acts 
of terrorism.
We’ve now reached a third stage in the evolution of modern jihadist propaganda, which a New York Times article 
has named ‘online Jihad 3.0’. ISIL members, who’ve grown up with the technology, are adept at using the entire 
range of disseminating tools at their disposal. JustPaste is used to publish summaries of battles that have taken 
place, SoundCloud to release audio reports of activities, WhatsApp and Kik Messenger to communicate and send 
images and videos, and Instagram, Facebook and Twitter to share images, propaganda and messages from the front 
lines. On Twitter, ISIL uses ‘twitter bombs’ to redirect trending hashtags to Twitter content and websites related 
to ISIL. The group also uses ‘twitter bots’ that repeatedly post the same content several times a day, along with 
popular hashtags such as #worldcup2014 to ensure that references to ISIL trend highly and that ISIL’s messages—
designed to both intimidate and inspire—reach the broadest possible audience. One analyst, tracking mentions of 
ISIL on Twitter in February 2014, found that ISIL registered more than 10,000 mentions of its hashtag per day.3 There 
are even Q&A on Ask.FM sessions about joining the group, the logistics involved and what it’s like to be on the front 
lines. ISIL’s messages are tailored to its audiences and change depending on whether they’re intended for a local 
audience or Western would-be recruits. What ISIL has managed to do is to bring the battlefield, its gore, and those 
doing the fighting into the bedrooms of millions, in a way unparalleled in the past.
One thing’s for sure—ISIL’s rapid battlefield success, wealth and claims of a caliphate have been an intoxicating 
blend for those considering joining. A photo shared by pro-ISIL Twitter users shows three bullets, each with a 
different top: ‘A bullet. A pen. A thumb drive … There is a different form of jihad’.4 
Generating funds
Al-Qaeda depended mainly on funding from benefactors, beginning with Bin Laden himself and extending to a 
global network of sympathisers. Its affiliates have gained financially through similar means, along with kidnap for 
ransom, extortion and a range of other criminal activities. At its peak, al-Qaeda’s financial network was estimated 
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to be worth around US$300 million.5 ISIL has managed to transform itself from a group that was largely reliant on 
wealthy Persian Gulf donors to one that’s largely self-sustaining, with financial resources estimated to be as high as 
US$2 billion, far outweighing al-Qaeda’s financial muscle.6 
US intelligence estimates that, at its peak, ISIL was earning more than US$3 million per day from oil resources, 
looting, kidnapping, human trafficking, smuggling and the taxation of populations it occupies. Before the coalition 
airstrikes, ISIL had control of about 12 oilfields in Syria and Iraq estimated to have a potential production capacity of 
more than 150,000 barrels per day, which could then be smuggled across the borders and sold in the black markets 
of Syria, Turkey, the Kurdistan region of Iraq and, potentially, Iran.7 
Following its battlefield successes and occupation of various cities, most notably Mosul, ISIL has looted banks, 
museums and businesses to extract currency and valuable antiquities, which are sold in regional black markets. 
Millions more are made from ransoms paid for kidnapped individuals, even though there’s been a recent shift 
towards executing kidnapped journalists and workers from non-government organisations. The sale of women 
and children as slaves has added millions to ISIL’s finances, and the taxation of populations in areas that the group 
controls is a rich source of funding, especially since refusal to pay results in death. It’s estimated that ISIL benefited 
by $8 million per month from this form of extortion in Mosul alone.8 
Being so cash-rich means that ISIL can afford to acquire new weapons on the black markets, supplementing those it 
has taken from retreating Iraqi forces. It also means that the group can maintain large numbers of frontline fighters 
and make financial donations to the families of those who die while fighting for it. This financial autonomy means 
that targeting ISIL’s financial resources is pivotal to reducing its capacity to fight and recruit, and should be an 
absolute priority in lowering its appeal and striking its strongholds in Syria and Iraq.
What international terrorist threat does ISIL present?
ISIL has devoted a great deal of effort to trying to build an ‘Islamic State’ and calling on Muslims from across the 
globe to join its ranks, assist in fighting to build that state and expand the borders of its self-styled ‘caliphate’. 
However, no other major established jihadist groups have pledged full allegiance to the caliphate. Those that have 
supported it have been various splinter groups attempting to use the ISIL brand to gain additional support for their 
own organisations. Indeed, some groups have used ISIL’s emergence to reaffirm their solidarity with al-Qaeda, 
illustrating that al-Qaeda isn’t finished as part of the global terrorist threat.
Rather than having a strategy of directly targeting Western nations, as al-Qaeda does, ISIL has wanted to build a 
caliphate as the basis for strengthening its organisation, ideology and finances. Despite this apparently inward 
focus, there’s no doubt that beyond its ‘state building’ phase ISIL presents a threat to Western nations, as 
al-Baghdadi’s globalist ambitions have never been hidden. With the onset of coalition air strikes, ISIL has begun 
to sharpen its focus on Western nations, and attacks in Canada and Belgium and foiled plots in Australia, France 
and the UK (among other countries) demonstrate the growing internationalism of the group. Its chief spokesman, 
Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, has increasingly called for attacks on the West, including to defeat both Washington 
and Rome.9 
The number of foreign fighters being drawn into ISIL’s ranks is of great concern. Many national governments are 
concerned about the repercussions of the return of battle-hardened fighters to their states of origin. This is a 
problem most of all for nations with weak domestic security forces, but which have contributed many fighters to 
ISIL (such as Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Indonesia). The appeal of ISIL’s ideology outweighs the popular appeal that 
al-Qaeda once had, and dealing with its ideology and recruits is stretching the policy mechanisms of many states.
However, ISIL hasn’t sought to carry out large-scale attacks in Western nations, such as those launched by 
al-Qaeda’s networked terrorist cells in the past. The former US Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, 
Matthew Olsen, stated that ISIL has no cells in the US, and that it ‘is not al Qaeda pre-9/11’.10 However, degrading 
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its capability now, rather than waiting for it to grow and have the capacity to develop such networks, is a 
prudent approach.
ISIL has pushed for its supporters to carry out attacks using low-level weaponry in their own nations and filming 
those attacks to promote ISIL and draw more supporters to its cause. Networked cell-structured groups are more 
likely to be detected by counter-terrorism forces due to their need to communicate, potentially hold physical 
meetings, and move among a large number of people who might report suspicious behaviour. But an individual 
working alone is more difficult to detect and can be more unpredictable in their actions, creating considerable 
difficulties for government counterterrorism agencies, especially when those agencies aren’t well developed.
It’s likely that ISIL will continue to push for international attacks by its followers, especially as it comes under 
increasing pressure from airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, but the direct threat that the group poses to those nations 
closer to its centre of gravity is far greater. Nations such as Tunisia, Turkey, Libya, Morocco and Indonesia, significant 
numbers of whose citizens have been drawn to ISIL’s ranks as fighters, must all be supported to cope with the 
spread of the ideology and the repercussions of fighters returning home.
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CHAPTER 9
US strategy in Iraq: a glass half full
Benjamin Schreer
Most initial assessments of the first three months of the US-led military operation in Iraq have criticised the limited 
use of air power and ‘boots on the ground’ against ISIL fighters. This strategy is seen as ineffective to ‘destroy’ ISIL 
and to restore political stability in Iraq. Instead, critics have called for the ‘decisive’ use of air power and increased 
ground forces. However, such criticism fails to recognise the bigger strategic picture behind the US approach to the 
conflict. It also doesn’t acknowledge that the military campaign is long-term, iterative and incentive-based, and 
is aimed to manage the threat by ISIL rather than defeat it. While the strategy certainly faces significant risks and 
challenges in the future, President Obama’s measured approach shouldn’t be dismissed lightly.
Iraq 2014 isn’t Iraq 2003
Critics might argue that the US President isn’t really invested in ‘winning’ the conflict in Iraq but is instead applying a 
minimalist use of force for purely domestic reasons. Having just achieved his goal of ending America’s costly military 
engagement in Iraq, he might want to leave the problem to his successor after he leaves office in late 2016. While 
this calculus might influence Obama’s decision-making, it’s likely that his Iraq strategy during the period in question 
has been influenced by a much more substantial domestic factor. After the experience of spending significant blood 
and treasure in Afghanistan and Iraq for limited returns, the American public increasingly supports a grand strategy 
of restraint when it comes to ‘wars of choice’. By and large, there’s bipartisan scepticism about a massive military 
re-engagement and nation-building in Iraq. This is also emblematic of the fact that, while ISIL constitutes a security 
problem, it’s not an existential threat to the US and most coalition partners (including Australia). That is, even if ISIL 
can’t be defeated permanently, it might be sufficient to ‘manage’ the threat.
Moreover, a key lesson learned from more than a decade of fighting ‘small wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan is that 
long-term success depends ultimately on political conditions in the host country. Even a large military footprint and 
billions of dollars in civilian assistance didn’t generate lasting solutions. Iraq’s track record is very poor, indeed. One 
key factor of ISIL’s success has been the failure of the previous Iraqi regime to develop effective state structures. 
Indeed, in many ways it systematically undermined them.1 Chances are low that repeating a costly and lengthy 
US-led intervention would be successful this time, given the complicated political and socioeconomic dynamics in 
Iraq, as well as the ambiguous role played by powerful neighbours such as Iran.
In combination, these factors have led the Obama administration to pursue a different Iraq strategy in 2014 
compared to the 2003 war. On a grand strategic level, the US is sending a signal to the Middle East that this time it 
won’t fight ‘other people’s wars’. Instead, Washington will conduct a long-term, light-footprint campaign, focused 
on supporting those groups in Iraq that are willing to fight for their country and work towards a political solution.2 
That’s why the coalition has insisted on certain criteria being met before commencing military operations. 
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For instance, the air campaign was contingent on Prime Minister Maliki’s resignation and the formation of a new 
government. As well, the deployment of an additional 1,500 military advisers to Anbar Province was dependent 
upon the agreement of the new Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, to incorporate the Sunni minority into the 
government and to arm Sunni tribes. It can be expected that further military operations will also be incentivised.
The military strategy has also been designed from the start to be iterative. Both Obama and the US military 
leadership have been careful in stating that air power alone is insufficient. Rather, in the first ‘advise and assist’, 
airstrikes have been a primary means and have arguably had some success in halting ISIL’s momentum and 
preventing the fall of Baghdad. In particular, they’ve stopped the advance of ISIL fighters in many areas and forced 
them to adapt their tactics through dispersal and concealment. As the airstrike data in this report shows (see 
Appendix 2 to this report), coalition warplanes have increasingly run out of targets.
Consequently, Obama announced a ‘new phase’ of the military campaign, using air power and indigenous ground 
troops to ‘start pushing [ISIL] back’. And, as of late November, there were encouraging signs that the Iraqi Army, 
supported by Shia militias and coalition air power, had been successful in doing so in some instances (recapturing 
the key oil refinery in Bayji was one example). Allied air attacks in Syria have also made it more difficult for ISIL to 
sustain operations in Iraq. It’s fair to conclude that the air campaign—in combination with some ground operations 
conducted by mostly indigenous forces—has put ISIL on the defensive.
Can it work?
It’s too early to tell. Admittedly, the strategy carries significant risks. The second phase (‘building partner capacity’) 
will be much more protracted and risky, and the outcome is more uncertain. It requires the coalition to provide 
more training and mission assistance to local forces on the ground (thereby increasing the risks), to strengthen its 
human intelligence capacity and to conduct close air support. It also depends on the ability to rapidly build up a 
sizeable and combat-capable indigenous force able to operate with diverse groups, including Iranian special forces. 
It remains to be seen whether indigenous Iraqi forces will be able to start ‘rolling back’ ISIL forces across the country 
as planned by next year.
The third phase (sustained ‘security sector reform’ in Iraq) will be even more challenging, particularly since it’s 
not clear yet what the political end-state would look like. Will the political actors in Iraq be able to reconcile their 
differences and launch a joint approach against ISIL? What’s an acceptable role of Iran in the future of Iraq?
And the coalition has to make some very tough choices on Syria, since the conflicts are interconnected. Particularly, 
the future of Syrian President Assad is a conundrum, given that many Arab countries want to see him removed while 
powerful players, such as Iran and Russia, remain loyal to him. As a result, the Obama administration has reinforced 
its efforts to find a Syria strategy to deal with the ISIL problem.3 
Therefore, the military campaign is still in search of a viable political endgame in both Iraq and Syria. In the long 
term, this problem might render the coalition’s efforts rather futile. Nevertheless, at this point it’s difficult to 
perceive a politically acceptable alternative strategy.
From an Australian perspective, it’s important to keep the overall US approach to the campaign in mind. This isn’t 
an application of the Weinberger/Powell doctrine of using overwhelming force to determine the outcome on the 
ground. Rather, in a break with past US practice, it’s a case of ‘nudging the conflict in the right direction’.4 After 
all, this approach also provides opportunities to improve the US’s troubled relationship with Iran. It also entails 
relatively low risks for coalition forces and costs only a fraction of the price of previous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
It’s therefore prudent to assume that the US is willing and able to sustain this approach for quite some time.
But what if the strategy proves unworkable regardless? While US commanders have indicated that under such 
conditions they would reassess the approach to the war in Iraq and Syria, Washington is likely to be very careful 
to avoid another ‘mission creep’ à la Vietnam. Instead, the light-footprint approach would allow the coalition to 
withdraw from the theatre relatively quickly. There might well be a scenario in which the US decides to leave Iraq 
and Syria to their own devices and to focus on much bigger geostrategic challenges in other parts of the world.
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APPENDIX 1
Airstrikes database methodology
ASPI’s airstrikes database is available at first100days.aspi.org.au.
Data sources
The primary source of data for this study’s airstrikes database is US Central Command (CENTCOM) news releases. 
Other sources include CENTCOM’s YouTube channel and other US Government websites. Only open-source 
information has been consulted.
To prevent the duplication of CENTCOM information, other coalition country briefings were not included in the 
airstrikes database. For that reason, if a coalition partner has carried out airstrikes not reported by CENTCOM, those 
airstrikes are not captured here.
So far as we can tell, this database is the most accurate open-source collation of information on coalition airstrikes 
in Iraq and Syria to date. The methodology we have used ensures no inadvertent duplication of information.
Data collation
Total airstrikes
The primary unit of observation for this database is defined as a strike: a kinetic action launched against a single 
target or specified group of targets. This unit of observation doesn’t include the type of ordnance used or the 
number of sorties flown in a single strike. Those are variables within the single unit of observation.
Furthermore, the total number of strikes in this report may not be an exhaustive count of current strike activity.
Total strikes per location also vary based on CENTCOM reporting (see ‘Location’ below).
Location
The locations of almost all strikes have been identified based on CENTCOM news releases. The latitude and 
longitude of the locations is based on geographical coordinates supplied by Google Maps, Mapcarta and 
Geographic.org. The locations of strikes are reported by CENTCOM as in, near or in relation to specific towns or 
geographical features, so the coordinates used are not specific to exact locations of strikes or targets. Therefore, the 
latitude and longitude used may give a false degree of accuracy and specificity in relation to the true strike location.
Where precise strike locations are not provided by CENTCOM, coordinates were based on geographical vicinity of 
CENTCOM reporting. For example, CENTCOM news release #20140937 reported strikes in northwest Iraq. In this 
instance Sinjar is used as a point of reference for mapping purposes. 
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Furthermore, some CENTCOM news releases didn’t account for the number of strikes per location, but instead listed 
the total number of strikes for multiple locations (for example, strikes reported in CENTCOM news release #20140818 
on 16 August 2014). In those instances, a minimum and a maximum number of strikes were given to each location 
and the maximum count was listed as less than or equal to (≤) the maximum strikes possible on any given location, 
based on the total strike locations.
Strike times
Times of strikes are included where available and are given in 24-hour format. Data over 12- (overnight), 24-, 48- and 
72-hour periods are listed based on CENTCOM reporting periods. Times are listed as NA (not available) where strike 
times were unreported. All times reported are displayed in Arab Standard Time (AST, UTC+3).
Coalition countries
When reported by CENTCOM, international coalition countries taking part in strikes have been listed. When 
countries have not been specified (for example, for strikes listed in CENTCOM news release #20141107), coalition 
countries are listed as US & Undetermined Partner Nation/s.
The coalition nations conducting airstrikes in Iraq are the US, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands and the UK. Coalition nations conducting airstrikes in Syria include the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
Jordan, Qatar and Bahrain.
Platform
The platforms used to conduct strikes are listed based on CENTCOM news releases. They include a mix of US and 
partner nation attack, bomber, fighter and remotely piloted aircraft (and rotary wing aircraft and Tomahawk 
land-attack missiles, each on one occasion). The aircraft type is listed where available. The type of ordnance used 
was not reported by CENTCOM and is not listed.
Strike effects and outcomes
Effect classifications
Assessments of the effects of airstrikes are given as suppressed, struck, damaged, severely damaged or destroyed, 
based on initial reports. These classifications reflect those made in CENTCOM news releases.
Unclear data
Targets are also divided into minimums and maximums, with the maximums showing NA where the total number of 
units is unclear or hasn’t been provided.
Minimums are shown in the dataset to be greater than a particular number (e.g. >2) where outcomes reported were 
unclear. For example, assessments by CENTCOM news release #20141107 of airstrikes conducted southeast of Deir 
ez-Zor between 7 and 10 November 2014 reported damage to several structures of an ISIL oil collection facility. In 
this case, the minimum damage is shown to be greater than two (>2) and two is used as the basis for analysis.
Target classifications
Command and observation posts
For the purposes of data entry, Command Posts are presumed to be ISIL structures, while Observation Posts are 
presumed to be mobile ISIL fighters. Note that Observation Posts haven’t been included in Total Reported Killed but 
have instead been accounted for alongside ISIL Mortar Positions, Fighting Positions and Units in the dataset.
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Units
Units are classified into small, large and tactical variants in tables but are represented only as units in 
primary datasets.
Total reported killed
CENTCOM news releases don’t specify total numbers of fighters killed in strikes. Total fighters killed have been 
included into the research data only where ISIL casualties have been reported by CENTCOM. Due to vague reporting 
on total casualties (such as in CENTCOM news release #20140925 on 23 September 2014), numbers listed in the data 
are based on total minimums and are shown in the dataset to be greater than two (>2).
Other
Other includes strikes made on Khorasan Group targets and a stray resupply bundle from a US airdrop of Kurdish 
supplies made on 19–20 October 2014. Khorasan Group targets have not been included in strike effect and outcome 
graphs or tables unless otherwise mentioned.
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APPENDIX 2
Airstrikes data
Table 3: Coalition airstrikes by location
Location Total strikes
Ain Aissa, Syria 1
al-Asad, Iraq 6
al-Hasakah, Syria 10
al-Mayadin, Syria 1
al-Qa'im, Iraq 10
Aleppo, Syria 14
al-Malikiyah District, Syria 1
Amirli, Iraq 4
Ar Raqqah/ Raqqah, Syria 23
Ar Rutbah/ Rutba, Iraq 10
Aynzalah, Iraq 1
Baghdad, Iraq 28
Bayji/ Baiji, Iraq 68
Dayr az Zawr/Deir ez-Zor, Syria 45
Dhībān, Syria 7
Erbil/ Irbil, Iraq 31
Fallujah Dam, Iraq 2
Fallujah, Iraq 61
Haditha Dam, Iraq 16
Haditha, Iraq 3
Haram/ Harem, Syria 1
Hayy al-Arabi, Iraq 1
Hit, Iraq 7
Khusham, Syria 3
Kirkuk, Iraq 53
Kobani/ Kobane, Ayn al-Arab, Syria 282
Manbij, Syria 2
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Location Total strikes
Mazra al-Duwud, Syria 3
Mosul Dam, Iraq 139
Mosul, Iraq 28
Qurayat al-Hajjaj (Al Kuray 'at), Iraq 2
Rabiyah/ Rabiaa/ Rabia, Iraq 2
Ramadi, Iraq 18
Sarmada, Syria 2
Shadadi, Syria 1
Sharra, Syria 1
Sinjar Mountain, Iraq 5
Sinjar, Iraq 45
Tabqah/ Tabqa Airfield, Syria 2
Taji, Iraq 1
Tall Abyad, Syria 1
Tall Afar/ Tel Afar/ Tal Afar, Iraq 5
Tikrit, Iraq 1
Zumar, Iraq 2
Combined strikes
al-Hasakah, Manbij, Kobani/ Kobane and Ar Raqqah/ Raqqah (Syria) 7
al-Mayadin, al-Hasakah, Abu Kamal and Dayr az Zawr/ Deir ez-Zor (Syria) 13
al-Tabqah/ Tabqah, Tall al-Qitar, Dayr az Zawr/ Deir ez-Zor, al-Hasakah and Abu Kamal (Syria) 14
Erbil/ Irbil and Mosul Dam (Iraq) 16
Total at 24 November 2014 999
Based on data sourced from US Central Command news releases, 8 August to 24 November 2014, online.
Table 4: Coalition airstrikes by target type
Target type Total suppressed, struck, damaged, 
severely damaged or destroyed
ISIL vehicles  
Armed trucks / trucks (non-descript) 34
Armed vehicles* 166
Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) 17
Armoured vehicles 17
Boats on Euphrates River 12
Construction vehicles (non-descript) 1
Convoys 2
Convoy vehicles 17
Dump trucks 2
Front-loaders 3
Excavators 4
Humvees / High-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) 62
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Target type Total suppressed, struck, damaged, 
severely damaged or destroyed
ISIL bulldozers 11
Light armoured vehicles 1
Mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles 2
Motorcycles 1
Support vehicles 3
Supply trucks 4
Tanks 34
Transport vehicles (including anti-aircraft artillery transport vehicles) 7
Vehicles (non-descript)* 197
Total at 24 November 2014 597
ISIL camps and training facilities  
Military camp 1
Training camps 8
Training compounds* 2
Training facilities 3
Total at 24 November 2014 14
ISIL weaponry  
Ammunition caches / stockpiles* 2
Anti-aircraft artillery pieces 4
Artillery pieces 15
IEDs 1
ISIL heavy weapons (non-descript) 2
Machine guns (including heavy machines guns) 5
Mobile artillery 1
Mortar placements 2
Mortar tubes 2
Mounted machine guns 1
Rocket launchers 2
Vehicles mounted with / carrying anti-aircraft artillery guns* 8
Weapons cache / stockpile* 3
Total at 24 November 2014 48
ISIL oil refineries, collection points and stores  
Generator used for oil production 1
ISIL-controlled modular oil refineries 23
ISIL-controlled oil collection points 6
Oil collection equipment, holding tanks (including petroleum, oil and lubricant tanks) 
and pump stations*
6
Oil collection facilities and structures* 4
Total at 24 November 2014 40
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Target type Total suppressed, struck, damaged, 
severely damaged or destroyed
ISIL buildings, structures and facilities  
Airfields (including Tabqah Airfield and other ISIL held airfields) 4
Air observation buildings 1
Armoured vehicle compounds 1
Barracks 3
Buildings held (non-descript)* 98
Bunkers 16
Command and control facilities 6
Command posts 3
Compounds (non-descript)* 6
Depots and logistics buildings / complexes 4
Emplacements (including IED emplacements, fighting emplacements, machine gun 
emplacements and emplacement belts)
10
Garrisons 3
Guard towers / posts / shacks 10
Headquarters 4
ISIL facilities (non-descript)* 4
ISIL finance centres 1
ISIL safe houses 1
ISIL-built earthen berm 1
ISIL occupied buildings (non-descript) 54
ISIL tunnels 1
Obstructions 1
Production facilities 1
Staging areas / building / facilities (e.g. armoured vehicle staging facility) 42
Security building 1
Storage areas / buildings (e.g. occupied building used for ammunition stockpile) 1
Storage facilities (e.g. artillery storage facility) 4
Support buildings 1
Vehicle shelters 2
Weapons factories (e.g. IED factory) 1
Total at 24 November 2014 285
ISIL mortar positions, fighting positions and units  
Artillery positions 3
Command and control nodes 3
Fighting positions* 173
Firing positions 6
Machine gun firing positions (including heavy machine gun firing positions) 2
Large ground units 30
Mortar positions 16
Mortar teams 2
Embargoed until 11.59 PM AEDT 15 December. Media may report 16 December 2014.
56 STrIke from The AIr: THE FIRST 100 DAYS OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISIL 
ASPI STRATEGY
Target type Total suppressed, struck, damaged, 
severely damaged or destroyed
Observation posts 3
Small ground units* 127
Sniper positions 5
Suppressed attacks 1
Tactical units 40
Units (non-descript) 17
Total at 24 November 2014 428
Checkpoints  
Checkpoints 33
Total at 24 November 2014 33
Reported killed and other  
Reported killed—ISIL fighters* 20
Other—Khorasan Group targets / stray resupply bundles* 9
Total at 24 November 2014 29
*Includes figures that are ‘greater than or equal to’ (≥) and ‘greater than’ (>) e.g. ≥5 is counted as 5. 
Based on data sourced from US Central Command news releases, 8 August to 24 November 2014, online.
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APPENDIX 3
Coalition capability contributions
US—Operation Inherent Resolve1
• US Air Force assets in the region under US Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT):
– Approximately 90 fighter, bomber or other strike aircraft, including
» A-10 fighter aircraft
» F-15E Strike Eagle fighter aircraft
» F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter aircraft
» F-22 Raptor fighter aircraft
» B-1 Lancer bomber aircraft
» MQ-9 Reaper attack and reconnaissance remotely piloted aircraft
– Approximately 190 other aircraft supporting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, 
command-and-control, tanker or airlift missions, including
» E-3 surveillance aircraft
» E-8 surveillance aircraft
» RC-135 surveillance aircraft
» C-17 Globemaster III transport aircraft
» C-130 Hercules transport aircraft
» KC-10 transport and aerial refuelling aircraft
» KC-135 aerial refuelling aircraft
» RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance remotely piloted aircraft
» MQ-1 Predator reconnaissance remotely piloted aircraft
• Aircraft taking part in the campaign from the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group (approximate numbers):2 
» 12 x F/A-18E Super Hornet fighter aircraft
» 12 x F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter aircraft
» 20 x F/A-18C/D Hornet fighter aircraft
» 5 EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft
» 5 x EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft
» 4 x E-2C Hawkeye all-weather airborne early-warning aircraft
» 2 x C-2A Greyhound logistics aircraft
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» 8 x MH-60S Seahawk helicopters
» 10 x MH-60R Seahawk helicopters
• Other surface vessels deployed with the USS Carl Vinson:
» Guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill
» Guided-missile destroyer USS Gridley
» Guided-missile destroyer USS Sterett
» Guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey
• The Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group and the embarked 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (approximate 
numbers):3 
» Amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island
» Amphibious transport dock ship USS San Diego
» Dock landing ship USS Comstock
» More than 2000 marines
» 12 x MV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft
» 8 x AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft
» 4 x CH-53E Super Stallion heavy-lift helicopters
» 4 x AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters
» 3 x UH-1Y Venom utility helicopters
• (Unconfirmed) AH-64D Apache attack helicopters (operating from Baghdad)4 equipped with AGM-114 
Hellfire missiles
Australia—Operation Okra5 
• 6 x F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter aircraft, equipped with 500-pound laser- and GPS-guided bombs
• 1 x E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft
• 1 x KC-30A multi-role tanker transport aircraft
Bahrain6 
• 2 x F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter aircraft
Belgium—Operation Desert Falcon7 
• 6 x F-16 fighter aircraft
• 1 x C-130 Hercules transport aircraft
Canada—Operation Impact8 
• 6 x CF-188 Hornet fighter aircraft
• 1 x CC-150T Polaris aerial refueller aircraft
• 2 x CP-140M Aurora surveillance aircraft
• 1 x CC-130J Hercules transport aircraft
• 1 x CC-177 Globemaster III strategic airlifter
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Denmark—Operation Inherent Resolve9 
• 7 x F-16 fighter aircraft
• 1 x C-130J transport aircraft
France—Opération Chammal10 
• 9 x Rafale fighter aircraft, equipped with:
– GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided air-to-ground bombs
– Armement Air-Sol Modulaire (Air-to-Ground Modular Weapon) precision-guided munitions
• 6 x Mirage fighter aircraft
• 1 x Airbus A400M Atlas transport aircraft
• 1 x C-135F tanker aircraft
• 1 x E-3F airborne early warning and control aircraft
• 1 x Atlantique 2 long-range maritime patrol aircraft
• On 28 October, the anti-aircraft frigate Jean Bart joined the US Fifth Fleet deployed in the Persian Gulf, under the 
command of the US admiral commanding the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group.
Iraq11 
• 3 x Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan attack aircraft
• 2 x SB7L-360 Seeker surveillance aircraft
• 5 x Beech 350ER King Air surveillance aircraft
• 3 x C-130E Hercules transport aircraft
• 6 x C-130J-30 Hercules transport aircraft
• 6 x Antonov An-32B Cline transport aircraft
• 8 x Cessna 208B Grand Caravan light transport aircraft
• 8 x Cessna 172 light transport aircraft
• 1 x Beech 350 King Air light transport aircraft
• 26 x Mi-17 Hip H multi-role helicopters
• Approximately 4 x SA342 Gazelle multi-role helicopters
• 10 x OH-58C Kiowa reconnaissance helicopters
• 8 x Mi-171Sh transport helicopters
• 16 x Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) light transport helicopters
• 10 x Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger light transport helicopters
• 24 x Bell T407 light transport helicopters
• 5 x Sukhoi Su-25 fighter aircraft (delivered by Russia on 28 June 2014; a further 7 are to be delivered)12 
• 3 x Sukhoi Su-25 fighter aircraft (delivered by Iran in July 2014)13 
• 23 x Mi-28 Havoc attack helicopters (delivered by Russia in September 2013 and January 2014)14 
• Purchasing 36 x F-16 fighter aircraft and 24 x Apache attack helicopters from the US (delivery expected to begin 
in early 2015)15 
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Italy16 
• 4 x Tornado aircraft (for reconnaissance missions in Iraq only)
• 1 x KC-767A air-to-air refuelling tanker aircraft
• 2 x (unarmed) Predator remotely piloted aircraft
• 1 x C-130J transport aircraft
Jordan17 
• Up to 6 x F-16 fighter aircraft
Netherlands18 
• 8 x F-16 fighter aircraft
Qatar19 
• 2 x Mirage fighter aircraft
Saudi Arabia20 
• 4 x F-15S Eagle fighter aircraft
Singapore21 
• 1 x KC-135R aerial refuelling aircraft
United Arab Emirates22 
• 4 x F-16 fighter aircraft
United Kingdom—Operation Shader23 
• 8 x Tornado GR4 strike aircraft, equipped with:
– Brimstone air-to-ground attack missiles
– 500-pound Paveway IV laser- and GPS-guided bombs
– Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles
• MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted aircraft, equipped with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles
– authorised to fly surveillance missions over Iraq and Syria
– authorised to conduct strikes in Iraq; not authorised to use weapons in Syria
• RC-135W Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft
– authorised to fly surveillance missions over Iraq and Syria
• 1 x Airbus A330 multi-role tanker transport Voyager aircraft
• 2 x C-130 transport aircraft
• 4 x CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters
• On 3 October, HMS Defender was assigned to protect the US carrier launching aircraft into Iraq and Syria.
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ACRONYMS AND 
ABBREVIATIONS
ADF Australian Defence Force
AQI Al-Qaeda in Iraq
CENTCOM US Central Command
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
IED improvised explosive device
ISI Islamic State of Iraq
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISOF Iraqi Special Operations Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
RAF Royal Air Force
UAE United Arab Emirates
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States of America
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